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POST-SALE RESTRAINTS AND
COMPETITIVE HARM:THE FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE
HERBERT HOVENKAMP*

INTRODUCTION: SOURCES OF LEGAL POLICY TOWARD
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

This Article examines one particular question at the intersection of
competition policy and intellectual property (IP) doctrine: are there
sufficient reasons within either IP policy or competition law for treating
post-sale restraints on patented or copyrighted goods differently from
those on other goods? This Article also considers whether we should
treat restraints contained in license agreements that do not involve a
technical sale differently from those contained in other types of
contracts.1
The term “post-sale restraint” refers generically to any restriction
imposed by a seller on how a purchased good can be used or resold after
the initial sale. In the context of the term “post-sale restraint,” “sale”
includes leases, licenses, or other transfers of interest short of a technical
sale. The differences among these various types of transfers can be
decisive in legal policy. For example, IP law’s “first sale” doctrine
applies only to true sales, as does the antitrust law of resale price
maintenance. By contrast, “tying” law applies to sales, leases, and
licenses without significant differentiation. Despite these legal
distinctions, differences in the type of transfer are typically unimportant
for understanding the fundamental economics of post-sale restraints,
although they can be in some instances, such as where product durability
is a problem for the monopolist.2 In 2008 the Supreme Court decided an
important post-sale restraint case involving patents and a form of quasiexclusive dealing.3 At this writing, an equally divided Supreme Court
has affirmed another first sale decision involving copyrights and resale
price maintenance. 4
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa School of Law.
Thanks to Christina Bohannan for commenting on a draft.
1. On the use of such restraints in copyright licenses, see Christina Bohannan,
Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616 (2008).
2. See infra notes 182–89 and accompanying text.
3. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
4. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
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In antitrust, the relevant law is that of vertical restraints, sometimes
called “restricted distribution” or “vertical restrictions.”5 Vertical
restraints are typically classified as “intrabrand” or “interbrand.” An
intrabrand restraint limits the way a seller’s own product can be
distributed or used. The classic example is resale price maintenance
(RPM), in which the seller of a product stipulates its resale price. 6 There
are also intrabrand nonprice restraints, which might, for example, limit
the locations in which downstream parties can resell the product,
segregate commercial from noncommercial users,7 or specify in detail
the conditions under which a product may be resold. Most field of use
restrictions in patent law are intrabrand restraints.8 By contrast, an
interbrand restraint limits either the purchaser’s ability to use the product
with things produced by other suppliers, or a reseller’s ability to sell the
goods of other sellers. The most common interbrand restraints are tying
and exclusive dealing. A tying arrangement requires that the purchaser
of a “tying” product (say, a printer) use it exclusively with that seller’s
own “tied” product (ink). 9 Exclusive dealing forbids a reseller handling
that copyright’s statutory first sale doctrine did not apply to good that was manufactured
outside United States but that bore design registered in United States Copyright Office;
infringement defendant allegedly sold watch at lower price than that which plaintiff had
stipulated in license), aff’d by an equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 565, No. 08-1423,
2010 WL 5058406 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2010) (Kagan, J., not participating).
5. On vertical restraints under the antitrust laws, see PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER
ELHAUGE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 17 (2d ed. 2004) (tying);
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 16 (3d ed. 2010)
(intrabrand restraints); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 18 (2d ed. 2005)
(exclusive dealing).
6. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)
(resale price maintenance per se unlawful under antitrust laws), overruled by Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (applying rule of
reason).
7. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449–50 (7th Cir. 1996)
(software licensing agreement distinguishing commercial and noncommercial users).
8. See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456–59 (1940)
(resale price maintenance); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126
(1938) (limitation to noncommercial uses). Field of use restrictions can also facilitate
horizontal market division. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
386, 400 (1945).
9. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006)
(refusing to condemn printer-ink tie after upsetting judicially created presumption that
patent in tying product conferred market power); Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1,
35–36 (1912) (refusing to apply first sale rule to post-sale tying condition), overruled by
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also Erik
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1443284.
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the seller’s product from also dealing in the competing product of any
rival. For example, a Ford dealership might be forbidden by its franchise
contract to sell new cars made by rival manufacturers.10
Throughout their legal history, vertical restraints have been
controversial, and their effects on competition and welfare have proven
notoriously difficult to assess. A purely vertical restraint does not
eliminate competition between rivals or reduce the number of firms in
any market. Nor does it make any firm larger.11 As a result, the twin
concerns of competition policy, collusion and dominant firm exclusion,
are often hard to identify. In some cases vertical restraints may channel
or restrict future development in ways that restrain innovation. 12 On the
other side, long-term vertical contracting typically reduces firms’ costs,
and IP restraints are essential devices for enabling firms to share risk or
to enhance the sharing of technology. More generally, vertical
restrictions are a very important compromise between unrestricted
market transactions and vertical integration through ownership. They
permit business entities to have some of the advantages of the marketdisplacing mechanisms of the business firm but without all of the costs
that outright ownership entails.13
But the use of contracts rather than ownership can also threaten
competition in ways that ownership integration typically does not. For
example, many of the rationales for condemning intrabrand restraints are
based, not on the market power of upstream sellers or IP right holders,
but rather on concern about powerful dealers or cartels of dealers that
may force suppliers to impose anticompetitive restrictions on these
10. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38
(2008) (refusing to enforce post-sale restraint forbidding purchasers from combining
goods with parts not made by Intel); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181,
191–96 (3d Cir. 2005) (condemning arrangement under which monopoly manufacturer
of dental materials forbade dealers from selling rivals’ goods). The classic antitrust
decision is Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949)
(condemning oil refiner’s restraint forbidding gasoline stations from selling other brands
of gasoline).
11. However, to the extent a restraint reduces a firm’s costs or excludes rivals,
increased size or market share may result.
12. E.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990)
(licensee of software not permitted to develop competing software; found to be unlawful
copyright misuse); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (condemning under antitrust laws many restraints that Microsoft imposed on
computer manufacturers and software producers to limit the development of rival
internet browser Netscape), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
13. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, 280–81
(1996); Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in
Antitrust Analysis, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2–3), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476.
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dealers’ rivals.14 A vertically integrated firm has no incentive to make its
distribution system less efficient internally. But independent dealers can
profit by limiting the competition between themselves and rival
dealers.15 Indeed, the Dr. Miles decision,16 which first brought resale
price maintenance under a per se rule, involved a cartel of retail
druggists that forced suppliers to impose price restraints on the cartel’s
price-cutting rivals.17
Vertical restraints often involve IP rights because most of these
restraints are specific to particular brands and technologies. Someone
selling a commodity such as potatoes typically has little to gain by
providing that they can be used only a certain way or resold only under
certain terms, unless of course the potatoes themselves are patented. 18
But that is often not true of manufactured goods, particularly if the
goods create an “aftermarket.” For example, purchase of a printer,
computer, or automobile may create ongoing demand for ink, software,
unique replacement parts, or maintenance. Further, dealers must make
long-run commitments to a particular seller’s good because effective
selling requires training in the characteristics and maintenance of
specific brands. Most vertical restraints in modern distribution systems
arise in markets where trademarks, copyrights, and patents are important
components.
The modern law of distribution restraints originated in nineteenthcentury IP doctrine, long before there were any antitrust laws. The first
significant body of distribution restraints law in the United States was
the judge-made “first sale” doctrine, often referred to as patent

14. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1604 (3d
ed. 2010).
15. Id.
16. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled
by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
17. Id. at 394, overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007). On the druggists’ cartel, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 331–48 (1991).
18. See Monsanto Co. vs. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 976–77 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(upholding post-sale restraint forbidding farmers from developing their own seed from
plants produced from patented seeds, without finding antitrust violation or misuse and
without discussing first sale doctrine); see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328,
1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding the first sale doctrine did not apply for two reasons:
first, the sale was conditional under Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700,
701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), a case that was subsequently overruled in Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), and second, the restriction on reuse did not operate
on the original seed that Monsanto sold to farmers, which was physically incapable of
reuse; rather it applied to second generation seed produced from that seed for which
there had never been an earlier sale).
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“exhaustion,” which limited a patentee’s ability to place restrictions on a
patented good after it had been sold. Where the first sale bar did not
apply, a breach of these restrictions could be enforced by a patent
infringement action as well as a breach of contract suit. The second body
of legal rules originated with the Sherman Antitrust Act, whose first
section condemns contracts that restrain trade, without any exceptional
treatment for IP license restrictions. 19 Later on, the Clayton Act
expressly condemned tying and exclusive dealing in both patented and
unpatented goods. 20 The third body of law concerns IP “misuse,” another
judge made doctrine that renders unenforceable an IP right held by a
patentee or copyright holder who violates IP policy by limiting sales or
use until the improper limitation is purged.21
These three doctrines—first sale, antitrust, and misuse—have
distinct histories, different technical requirements, and can be invoked in
different situations. At the same time, however, the amount of policy
overlap is significant. For example, the famous Motion Picture Patents
case of 1917 denied enforcement to a classic tying arrangement. 22 The
patentee forbade anyone using its projector from using films made by
rivals. The main body of the Supreme Court’s discussion concerned the
first sale doctrine. 23 But the Court also cited the Clayton Act as
supporting its decision.24 Today the decision is also widely regarded as a
“misuse” case. 25
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to make the law of postsale restraints more coherent in its recent Quanta Computer decision,
where it reverted to a strict application of the first sale rule not clearly
related to any policy of furthering competition or innovation. 26 Until
Quanta, the case law over the last two generations had consistently
19. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
20. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 14 (2006)).
21. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (misuse
renders patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged). On the scope of misuse doctrine
under IP policy, see Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1474407.
22. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
23. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
24. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 517–18 (citing § 13 of Clayton Act in
support of its conclusion under first sale doctrine).
25. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 331 (rev. 4th ed. 2007)
(using Motion Picture Patents as example of misuse).
26. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 (2008).
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pursued two themes: a benign attitude toward vertical restraints and a
belief that IP rights are not inherently monopolistic. The Quanta
decision is a reversion to an older form of patent “exceptionalism” that
viewed post-sale restraints on patented articles as inherently suspicious.
The Quanta case poses three questions. First, what kinds of postsale restraints are justifiable? Second, when should they be enforced by
contract law, and when by infringement actions? And third, when does
the presence of an IP right make a difference?
On the first question, good reasons exist for limiting certain vertical
restrictions: (a) they might injure competition by reducing output or
raising price; (b) they might restrain innovation; and (c) they might serve
to deny public access to public domain technology or information.27 But
these reasons do not exist in every case, or even in a majority of them.
As a result, harmful effects must be proven.
On the second and third questions, breach of contract actions and
infringement actions have different advantages and pose different
problems. Contracts are the least problematic because they can generally
be enforced only against people who are in privity. By contrast,
infringement actions can run against all who infringe an IP right, and
even those who knowingly contribute to the infringements of others.
This increases the risk that such actions will be imposed on unsuspecting
violators, although that problem can be addressed with a notice
restriction.28 For these very reasons, however, infringement actions are
also a more efficient mechanism for enforcing legitimate, welfareenhancing restraints. For example, imagine a regime of real property
rights in which servitudes such as easements or building restrictions had
to be contracted and re-contracted every time a piece of property was
resold. There are good reasons for preferring infringement actions over
contracts to enforce post-sale restraints in some situations but not others.
The Quanta decision did not discuss the issue.
The existence of three doctrinal avenues for assessing the effects of
vertical restraints involving IP rights has served to make the legal policy
incoherent over most of its history. Often condemnation or approval
rests on a contract detail that has no obvious relation to either innovation
policy or competition policy. For example, under the first sale doctrine,
all restraints become unenforceable as a matter of IP infringement
actions, whether or not they are anticompetitive or serve to restrain
innovation. At the other extreme, the antitrust laws were historically
hostile to vertical restraints, but today they rarely condemn vertical
restraints even if they serve to limit innovation substantially. The
27. Cf. Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4).
28. See infra notes 118–37 and accompanying text.
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competitive rationale for the “misuse” doctrine has never been
articulated properly in the courts, except for attempts to identify it with
antitrust policy or to identify the harm as an improper “extension” of an
IP right.29
The history of legal policy concerning post-sale IP restraints sheds
some light on why the doctrine is both so complicated and so wide of the
mark. The principal harms that can result from post-sale conditions are
restraints on competition and restraints on innovation. Restraints on
competition occur when a practice reduces output, increases prices, or
unreasonably excludes firms from a market. Restraints on innovation
occur when a practice acts to hinder rather than to promote innovation,
typically by imposing limitations on the innovations of others.30 Under
the system that we have developed, antitrust law and misuse law are
concerned almost exclusively with restraints on competition, and
occasionally with restraints on innovation. Under Quanta, the first sale
doctrine is not concerned with either one. Rather, when it applies, it
blocks enforcement of post-sale restrictions as a matter of IP policy
without regard to competitive impact or effect on innovation.
While these three doctrines—first sale, antitrust, and misuse—
originated at different times and addressed different issues, they largely
merged during the first half of the twentieth century. The first sale
doctrine grew out of the common law’s strong policy against restraints
on alienation, which had little to do with the protection of competition,
except in the sense that it prevented wealthy landowners from tying up
land in their families indefinitely. Harvard Law School Professor John
Chipman Gray’s influential 1890s treatise Restraints on the Alienation of
Property regarded the common law rules prohibiting restraints on
alienation as virtually sacred and a fixed part of nature.31 These concerns
dominated the development of patent law’s first sale doctrine, but they later
merged with very little friction into the antitrust law of vertical restraints.
When the Supreme Court first applied the antitrust laws to condemn resale
price limitations on goods that dealers had purchased, it relied on both
Gray’s treatise and the English common law limiting restraints on
alienation to hold that a supplier could not impose a post-sale restraint on
resale prices.32

29. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 17).
30. See id. (manuscript at 32–34); Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2007).
31. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii–viii
(2d ed. 1895).
32. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404–05 (1911),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).

NYU POST SALE RESTRAINTS 15 FEB 2011

108

2/15/2011 6:06 AM

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

The treatment offered here illustrates some of the relative
advantages and disadvantages of legislation vs. judge-made rules as law
reform devices in rapidly changing technological environments. One
comparative advantage of judge-made rules is their relative freedom
from interest-group capture—something that has plagued the IP laws
since their inception. 33 However, one significant disadvantage that
judges face is that they decide disputes one at a time and often in a
single doctrinal context. This severely limits their opportunity to
articulate a coherent policy about multi-faceted issues such as
competition policy and the encouragement of innovation. A welldesigned system of IP laws designed to encourage innovation while not
limiting competition unnecessarily would almost certainly not require
three different doctrines that are often overlapping, sometimes
inconsistent, and more often than not provide no value added
whatsoever.
I.
EARLY DISTRIBUTION RESTRAINTS AND FIRST SALE RULE

In the mid-nineteenth century, manufacturing firms began integrating
vertically into distribution and sale through individually franchised dealers
rather than manufacturer-owned outlets. For example, the McCormick
Harvesting Co. used a set of regional patent and trademark licenses to
create
ongoing
franchise-like
relationships
with
local
manufacturers/dealers, who could produce their machines locally and sell
them to farmers, thus making national shipment of this bulky equipment
unnecessary.34 The arrangement also permitted McCormick to share the
risk and cost of developing a nationwide distribution system. Such a
licensee might agree to be the exclusive resale agent for McCormick’s
reapers in a certain territory, or it might agree that it would not sell any

33. On copyright, see Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567 (2006); on patents, particularly during the formative era, see
Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice and Interest Groups in the
Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1870 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262970.
34. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 490 (1853) (describing
the arrangement). McCormick later changed to a more centralized distribution system
with wholly owned outlets. On the company’s history, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR.,
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 305–07,
402–08 (1977); THOMAS S. DICKE, FRANCHISING IN AMERICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
BUSINESS METHOD, 1840–1980, at 18–19 (1992). On the place of these practices in the
history of United States policy toward vertical integration, see generally Herbert J.
Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 863.
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reapers other than McCormick’s. Singer Corp. did something similar with
its sewing machines, except that the machines were produced centrally and
shipped to dealers rather than being produced by the dealers themselves.35
Competitive differences between the two methods chosen by
McCormick and Singer are not significant, and a firm chose the one that
was least costly and most effective for its own particular business. For
McCormick’s bulky but fairly simple wooden reapers, authorizing local
dealers to manufacture them saved transportation costs. Today, for many
fast-food franchises the food itself is “manufactured” at the restaurant from
local ingredients rather than shipped in finished form from the franchisor’s
location. Coca-Cola sells and ships concentrated syrup to its franchised
dealers, who then add water, carbon dioxide, and bottling, so in a real sense
part of a finished Coke is manufactured centrally by the franchisor and part
locally by each franchisee.36 By contrast, both today and in the past Ford
automobiles were manufactured at a central plant and shipped to dealers,
who prior to the sale did little more than cleanup and dealer prep work. The
first sale doctrine limits Ford’s ability to impose post-delivery restraints on
its automobiles, but not McCormick’s ability to restrain the resale of its
locally manufactured reapers. This is because in the Ford case the dealers
are receiving a manufactured product, while in the McCormick case they
are receiving only a license to manufacture, which is not covered by the
first sale doctrine.
Patent law’s first sale rule states that once the patentee sells or
authorizes the sale of a patented article, he has exhausted his rights with
respect to that article and cannot restrain subsequent purchasers. The
Court’s most forceful nineteenth century statement of the doctrine was
Adams v. Burke, which was a vertical territorial restraint case.37 Adams
involved a Civil War era patentee of coffin lids who had created a
controlled distribution system by licensing various makers to produce them
for sale in defined geographic areas and also restricted the areas in which
35. See RUTH BRANDON, SINGER AND THE SEWING MACHINE : A CAPITALIST
ROMANCE (1977); Andrew Godley, Selling the Sewing Machine Around the World:
Singer’s International Marketing Strategies, 1850–1920, 7 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 266,
272, 280–87 (2006); Andrew B. Jack, The Channels of Distribution for an Innovation:
The Sewing-Machine Industry in America, 1860–1865, 9 EXPLORATIONS IN
ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 113, 127–31 (1957).
36. See MARK PENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND COCA-COLA: THE
DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SOFT DRINK AND THE COMPANY THAT
MAKES IT 71 (2000).
37. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873). For a fuller statement of the facts, see Adams v.
Burks, 1 F. Cas. 100 (C.C. Mass. 1871) (No. 50). The Supreme Court originally announced
the doctrine in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1853) (“[W]hen the
machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent]
monopoly.”).
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the lids could be used. The firm of Lockhart and Seelye had acquired the
right to make and sell the coffin lids within ten miles of Boston, while
Adams had the right to make and sell them everywhere else. Lockhart and
Seelye then manufactured the lid in question and placed it on a coffin that it
sold to Burke, a mortician who used the coffin for a burial in Natick,
Massachusetts, about seventeen miles from Boston. The patentee claimed
that the burial violated the terms of the territorial limitation in the patent
license and thus constituted infringement.38
The Court assumed that the geographic restriction imposed on
Lockhart and Seelye’s manufacturing license was enforceable, but that
once a finished coffin lid was produced and sold to another, the purchaser
took it free and clear of all patent obligations and could use the lid for a
burial wherever he pleased. As a result, long before the antitrust laws were
passed, the first sale doctrine performed an “antitrust” function through the
patent licensing system by limiting the ability of manufacturers to impose
territorial restraints on the resale of products. As the Supreme Court
stated:
[I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person
having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in
its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the
right to restrict that use. The article, in the language of the court,
passes without the limit of the monopoly. That is to say, the patentee
or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or
consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that
particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the
patentees.39
The Supreme Court extended the first sale rule to copyrights in
1908, in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, which refused to enforce a resale
price maintenance restriction created in the context of an early restricted
distribution system.40 Bobbs-Merrill published The Castaway, a novel
written by Hallie Ermine Rives, a writer of popular and historical novels
38. Burke, 84 U.S. at 454.
39. Id. at 456; see also Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895)
(finding a bedstead patentee could not enforce a territorial limitation against a subsequent
purchaser). Some early cases raised an issue analogous to first sale when patentees attempted
to draft patents so as to cover both machines and consumables that would be used in them.
See Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894)
(finding the patentee’s combination patent covered both a device for dispensing toilet paper
rolls and the consumable rolls themselves). The Morgan Envelope Court rejected the claim
covering the rolls and held that it was not infringement for users of the device to purchase
their toilet paper elsewhere. Id. at 432–33.
40. 210 U.S. 339, 349–51 (1908).
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and books on etiquette.41 The book contained a notice printed on the
copyright page prohibiting anyone from reselling the book for less than
$1.00 per copy. Macy’s stores had purchased the book from a distributor
and then resold it to a customer for 89 cents. Relying on both the patent
exhaustion cases and the general policy against restraints on alienation, the
Court held that the sale of the book exhausted all rights conferred by the
Copyright Act, leaving Macy’s free to resell it at any price it chose. 42
Significantly for the development of future distribution law, the Court
observed that the price restriction was contained in the copyright license
and not in a distribution contract that the publisher had with Macy’s
department stores. Macy’s was not in privity of contract with the publisher,
and the case had been presented and argued completely as one of copyright
infringement rather than breach of a distribution contract.43 That distinction
was to prove critical in the future. As the law stood in 1908, any post-sale
restraint on a patented or copyrighted article that was imposed by means of
a licensing restriction and enforced by an infringement action was
unenforceable. However, the courts had not yet addressed the legality of
restricted distribution agreements under the Sherman Act.
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the first sale doctrine has
been largely consistent and absolute through most of its history. The
doctrine applies no matter how competitively structured the market is, and
whether or not anyone is excluded—that is, it reaches far beyond
conventional antitrust analysis. The first sale rule applies equally to
intrabrand restraints, such as location clauses or resale price maintenance,
and also to interbrand restraints such as tying or exclusive dealing. The rule
applies whether or not the restraint in question serves to promote or restrain
innovation; indeed, that question is not even relevant. The Court’s
reaffirmance of the first sale doctrine in the 2008 Quanta decision stated it

41. HALLIE ERMINIE RIVES, THE CASTAWAY (1904).
42. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350–51.
43. See id. at 346, 350:
The learned counsel for the appellant in this case, in the argument at bar,
disclaims relief because of any contract, and relies solely upon the copyright
statutes, and rights therein conferred. . . . There is no claim in this case of
contract limitation, nor license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of
the book . . . . In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of
the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the
right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at
which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is
no privity of contract.
Cf. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008) (refusing to
decide whether application of first sale doctrine had any implications for breach of
contract suits).
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in this broad, unqualified way,44 despite the Court’s recognition after more
than 30 years of antitrust jurisprudence that most post-sale restraints are
competitively harmless.
There have been two important historical exceptions to this consistent
and aggressive application of the first sale rule, one very briefly recognized
by the Supreme Court and one recognized nearly a century later by the
Federal Circuit. The first exception was a pair of decisions written by
Justice Lurton in 1896 and 1912, the first when he was on the Sixth Circuit
and the second after his appointment to the Supreme Court. Both decisions
involved tying arrangements with a patented tying product and unpatented
tied products, a practice that would later become the subject of sharp
antitrust controversy. In the Button-Fastener case in 1896, the Sixth Circuit
held that the first sale rule did not undermine a license restriction requiring
purchasers of the patentee’s patented button fastening machine to use only
its own fastening staples. 45 The restriction was written in the form of a
servitude, with a right of reverter upon violation. Judge Lurton effectively
turned the first sale doctrine into a licensing default rule by holding that it
applied only to “unconditional” sales. Clearly, he reasoned, a patentee’s
right to “use” his invention implied the right to license others subject to
similar use restrictions—that is, if the patentee could use his patented
fastener only with his own staples, he could also place the same restriction
on licensees.46 The only limitation that Lurton recognized on this power
was where a monopoly in the “unpatented article” might be created.47 In
the present case, however, there was no prospect of monopoly in the
unpatented staples, and the patentee’s only apparent purpose in using the
tie was to meter use of the machine for purposes of computing royalties.48
Such a use “may or may not result in the engrossment of the market for
staples,” and there was no evidence that it did so in this case.49
Judge Lurton ignored the Supreme Court’s concern with restraints on
alienation and attempted to import a competition policy into the first sale

44. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 636–37.
45. Heaton-Penninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288,
289–90 (6th Cir. 1896). The restriction read: “This machine is sold and purchased to use
only with fasteners made by the Peninsular Novelty Company, to whom the title to said
machine immediately reverts upon violation of this contract of sale.” Id. at 290.
46. Id. at 292 (“If, then, the patentee has the exclusive right to the use of his
invention or discovery, during the term of his patent, it would seem to follow that any
use by another, unauthorized by the patentee, would be an infringement of his
monopoly.”).
47. Id. at 294.
48. See id. at 296 (“The fasteners are thus made the counters by which the royalty
proportioned to the actual use of the machine is determined.”).
49. Id.
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doctrine by holding that a post-sale tying restraint ought to be unlawful
only if it led to a monopoly in the tied product. Lurton’s analysis is
remarkably similar to the way the Supreme Court began assessing tying
arrangements under the antitrust laws a generation later. Even in that case,
Lurton suggested, the monopoly in fasteners would not be odious if it
resulted from the superiority of the patentee’s stapling machine.50 Except
for a possible reference to restraints on trade, the opinion never cited the
Sherman Act, which had been passed six years earlier.51
Judge Lurton was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1909 by
President Taft, who had also been a Judge on the Sixth Circuit and had
been on the panel with Judge Lurton in the Button-Fastener case. In 1912,
Lurton wrote the Court’s opinion in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., stating in a
shorter version what he had said earlier in the Button-Fastener case.52 In
this case the patentee posted a license on its mimeograph copy machine
requiring purchasers to use its paper, ink, and stencils exclusively. It sold a
copy of the machine with the affixed license to Christina B. Skou, who
subsequently purchased a can of ink from Sidney Henry, an office supply
salesman, in violation of the restriction. The machine itself was sold at a
price of cost or less, indicating that A.B. Dick was earning its profits from
the tied supplies, and thus probably using the tie as a price discrimination
device, effectively earning a higher rate of return from higher volume
users.53 The action was brought against Henry for contributory patent
50. Id. Judge Lurton did rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in American CottonTie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882), in which the patentee sold metal ties for cotton
bales with a printed restriction that they were authorized for a single use only. The
defendant was in the business of salvaging the used ties and piecing them together for
resale. The Supreme Court found infringement, but did not address the first sale issue.
Rather, it held that the defendant’s conduct in piecing the broken parts of the ties
together constituted a reconstruction rather than a repair of the ties, and thus constituted
patent infringement.
51. The possible reference is this passage:
This brings us to consider the objections urged against the rather novel
restrictions contained in the licenses granted by complainant. The very able
counsel for appellees have urged very forcibly an argument based upon
principles of public policy in respect of monopolies and contracts in restraint
of trade, and have contended that public policy forbids a patentee from so
contracting with reference to his monopoly as to create another monopoly in an
unpatented article.
Id. at 292. The court rejected the contention with no further reference to the public policy
against monopolies and contracts in restraint of trade, concluding that any monopoly
created by the restriction was justifiably within the patent grant. Id. at 296.
52. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
53. On this fact, see Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1913)
(characterizing the facts of Henry). When the dominant firm shifts the monopoly

NYU POST SALE RESTRAINTS 15 FEB 2011

114

2/15/2011 6:06 AM

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

infringement.54 Once again, Lurton distinguished conditional and
unconditional sales and held that the first sale doctrine did not preclude
enforcement of a restraint contained in a conditioned sale. The reasoning
was mainly that, because the patentee could refuse to sell altogether, it
could sell subject to any condition it pleased. The Court pointed out that no
monopoly of the tied stencils, paper, and ink was in prospect:
The stencil, the paper, and the ink made by the patentee, will continue
to be unpatented. Anyone will be as free to make, sell, and use like
articles as they would be without this restriction, save in one
particular—namely, they may not be sold to a user of one of the
patentee’s machines with intent that they shall be used in violation of
the license.55
In 1914 Congress responded to Henry by passing § 3 of the Clayton
Act, which made anticompetitive ties unlawful whether the tying products
were leased or sold, and whether they were patented or unpatented.56
Henry was then resoundingly overruled by the Supreme Court in 1917 in
the Motion Picture Patents decision, which is discussed later.57 While the
Court found support for its decision condemning the patent tie in the newly
passed Clayton Act, the decision’s analysis was based almost exclusively
on the first sale doctrine.58 Motion Picture Patents is one of many
situations in which the Supreme Court commingled the first sale doctrine

overcharge to a tied product that is used in variable proportions, the rate of return on the
package increases as the number of units of tied product increases. For example, suppose
that the machine is sold at cost, $100, while the can of ink costs $5 and is sold for $15. If
a buyer takes one unit of the machine and one can of ink the return is
115(price)/105(cost), or 9.5%. If the buyers uses two cans of ink the return is 130/110, or
18%. If the buyer uses ten cans of ink the return is 250/150, or 67%. The premise
underlying such schemes is that more intense users value the machine by a greater
amount than less intense users. On the use of ties as price discrimination devices, and
impact on competition or consumers, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9.
54. Contributory infringement occurs when one knowingly aids or abets the
infringement of someone else. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). Contributory infringement is
not specified in the Copyright Act but is a judge made rule with similar requirements.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studies, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S 913, 930–31, 940–41
(2005) (vacating summary judgment that did not find copyright contributory
infringement); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433
(1984) (finding fair use defense by consumers undermined contributory infringement
claim against provider of videotape recorder).
55. Henry, 224 U.S. at 31–32.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 14, 38 Stat. 731 (Oct. 15, 1914).
57. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518
(1917) (“[T]he decision in Henry must be regarded as overruled.”) (citations omitted);
see also infra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.
58. See generally id.
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and antitrust concerns so as to produce a unitary policy.59
The second historical exception to first sale aggressiveness occurred
more recently, when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit revived
Justice Lurton’s attempt to make the doctrine turn on realistic threats of
monopoly.60 The Mallinckrodt case once again distinguished “conditional”
sales, which occur when the patentee places restrictions on the rights of
purchasers, thus conveying away less than its entire patent interest in the
article in question. 61 Because these conditions are couched in terms of
the patentee’s withholding of a portion of its patent rights, violations of
the restrictions are regarded as patent infringements. 62 And because the
first purchaser cannot transfer a larger interest than it owns, subsequent
purchasers acquire the good subject to the same conditions and are also
subject to patent infringement suits if the conditions are violated.
Finally, this condition can be created either by agreement with the first
purchaser, or simply by the patentee’s attachment of a notice to the
patented article. The only limitation the court found on this ability to
condition sales of patented goods is that the condition may not be one
that falls outside of the patent grant—meaning that the condition may
not violate the antitrust laws, constitute patent misuse, or be contrary to
public policy for some other reason.63 In sum, the court created a
patentee-initiated exception to the first sale doctrine for restraints that
did not violate the antitrust laws or other competition policy.
In its 2008 Quanta decision the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the Federal Circuit’s approach and restored the first sale rule to its original
broad scope.64 “The authorized sale of an article that substantially
embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the
patent holder from invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the
article.”65 The opinion failed to articulate any rationale for the doctrine
other than naked precedent and stare decisis. The Court largely ignored
the historical concern with restraints on alienation or the later concerns
with competition policy. Following the views of the Solicitor General, it
indicated that while conditions may be imposed at the time patented
goods are sold, these must be done by means of license restrictions

59. See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
60. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated by
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
61. Id. at 706–08; see also B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
62. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706–08.
63. Id. at 708.
64. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 (2008).
65. Id. at 638.
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rather than conditional sales.66 This means that the conditions can be
enforced only by breach of contracts suits, not by infringement suits, and
only against persons who are in privity with respect to the contract that
is being enforced. The Court expressed “no opinion on whether contract
damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to
eliminate patent damages.”67
II.
THE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND
COMPETITION POLICY

The Quanta decision leaves the impression that the first sale doctrine
never had anything to do with competition policy.68 But that is hardly the
case. Most of the first sale cases in the century between Henry (1912) and
Quanta (2008) involved either resale price maintenance or tying. While
after Henry the Supreme Court was consistent in its application of the first
sale rule, it also invariably linked the first sale doctrine to antitrust policy.
For example, the technical requirements of the first sale doctrine itself also
identified the boundary of unlawful RPM. Like the first sale doctrine, the
rule against RPM applied only when there was a sale of an object and then
a qualifying resale; it did not apply to services, processes, or production
licenses.69 Whether tying law would also have tracked the first sale
doctrine is difficult to say because § 3 of the Clayton Act intervened,
making clear that antitrust tying rules applied to both sales and leases, and
thus extending the range of antitrust into areas where the first sale doctrine
would not apply.
The aggressiveness with which the first sale rule was applied during
this period is hardly surprising, and is not inconsistent with the proposition
that the Supreme Court had competition policy in mind in first sale
decisions. During the same period, the Supreme Court was regularly hostile
toward these same restraints when they were analyzed under either antitrust
66. Id. at 636–38.
67. Id. at 637 n.7. The Court quoted the following passage from Keeler v. Standard
Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895):
Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts
brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we
express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as
a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of
the patent laws.
68. The court’s only mention of the antitrust laws was a brief reference to the fact
that the Univis Lens decision had contained an antitrust issue. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at
627 (discussing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 248–49 (1942)). Beyond
that, the decision contains no discussion of competition policy.
69. See infra notes 148–59 and accompanying text.
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rules or misuse doctrine. Indeed, virtually every Supreme Court case that
applied the first sale doctrine would have come out the same way70 under
antitrust or, in procedurally appropriate circumstances,71 misuse doctrine.
Many of the decisions expressly referenced the antitrust laws as well, just
as Motion Picture Patents did.72 Henry was anomalous for two reasons:
first, it deviated from Supreme Court first sale doctrine; second, it stood
alone among Supreme Court decisions in its benign attitude toward patent
tying arrangements—a position that was not to change until the late
1970s.73
Indeed, if the first sale doctrine does not find its purpose in either
competition policy or innovation policy, then it is difficult to find any value
for it other than precedent—a fact that did not trouble the Supreme Court in
Quanta. Over history, most of the Supreme Court’s decisions on the first
sale doctrine have attached its rationale to competition policy. Most
decisions that have applied the rule have involved either tying
arrangements or RPM, and the Court was typically not very subtle about
noting that the first sale rule and antitrust law pulled in tandem. This trend
was exacerbated by the extraordinary difficulty that courts have had in
understanding the economics of restricted distribution. Lacking a rationale
for explaining why vertical restrictions were anticompetitive in the
traditional sense of leading to reduced output and higher prices, antitrust
itself imported from the first sale doctrine the common law’s concern with
restraints on alienation.
A.

Tying and Resale Price Maintenance, 1908–1917

In its Dr. Miles decision, three years after Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme
Court cited both the first sale doctrine and the Sherman Act for the
proposition that even an explicit RPM agreement between a manufacturer
of a patent medicine and a retailer was contrary to legal policy.74 The Court
70. That is, it would have refused to enforce the restriction—not that the first sale
doctrine could justify an award of antitrust’s treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(2006).
71. “Misuse” typically arises only as a defense to an infringement action. See
Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 3).
72. See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
73. The Supreme Court began to develop a more benign attitude toward tying in
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) and U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); see also AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 5, ¶ 1733.
74. Interestingly, by that time Justice Lurton, who recused himself from Dr. Miles,
was already on record as believing that resale price maintenance was unlawful under the
antitrust laws. While on the Sixth Circuit he had written the Dr. Miles decision, which the
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
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expressly incorporated the common law policy against restraints on
alienation into its interpretation of the Sherman Act, quoting from Coke
upon Littleton, an early seventeenth-century edition of a fifteenth century
treatise on property law.75 Even the Schwinn decision more than a half
century later, which condemned a dealer distribution system that involved
territorial restraints, cited this “ancient rule against restraints on alienation”

164 F. 803 (6th Cir. 1908), aff’d, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Lurton rested the rationale on the
fact that Dr. Miles medicines were not patented and that the resale price maintenance
agreement was imposed by contract rather than license agreement. One important difference,
Lurton observed, was that a patent is of finite duration while contracts can be extended
indefinitely. As a result any monopoly thereby created would be more odious:
Any other conclusion would be to sanction a monopoly in that class of goods
vastly more far-reaching than the monopoly extended upon high grounds of
public policy to the inventor. The statutory monopoly has a limitation of a few
years. To obtain it the inventor must put on record his invention. At the end of
the term the public will be free to employ the discovery without the burden
theretofore imposed as a compensation to the inventor. Not so with the
monopoly asked for by those who control the enormous proprietary trade of
this country. Their monopoly will go on forever. . . .
See id. at 806. The strong implication was that if the medicines had been patented and the
RPM carried out by patent license rather than distribution contract, Lurton would have
applied his Button-Fastener and Henry analysis instead. In sum, for Lurton both tying and
resale price maintenance were lawful if imposed on patent goods by means of a patent
license. RPM was unlawful if imposed on unpatented goods by a simple contract. Soon-tobe Supreme Court Justice Van Devanter, while still on the Eighth Circuit, took that same
position with respect to resale price maintenance, holding that an RPM restriction placed on
a license to resell patented goods could be enforced by means of a patent infringement
action. See Nat’l Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 F. 733 (8th Cir. 1904). By contrast, in
Dr. Miles the Supreme Court found the resale price maintenance agreement to be fully
covered by the first sale doctrine announced in Bobbs-Merrill. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at
405 (analogizing to facts of Bobbs-Merrill, observing that Dr. Miles’ medicines were
neither patented nor copyrighted, and concluding that “It will hardly be contended, with
respect to such a matter, that the manufacturer of an article of commerce not protected by
any statutory grant is in any better case.”).
75. The Court was referring to Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke’s statement that if
someone
be possessed . . . of a horse or of any other chattel, real or personal, and give or
sell his whole interest or property therein, upon condition that the donee or
vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because the whole interest
and property is out of him, so as he hath no possibility of a reverter; and it is
against trade and traffic and bargaining and contracting between man and man.
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404–05 (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND : A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 360 (London,
W. Clarke 16th ed. 1809) (1628). The Court also referenced John Chipman Gray’s
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, §§ 27, 28 (2d ed. 1895). See supra notes
3132 and accompanying text. Gray’s book never mentioned patented or copyrighted
goods.
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as a rationale for applying the antitrust laws.76 Schwinn did not connect a
policy limiting restraints on alienation to lower output or higher prices.
The Court finally repudiated this rationale for applying antitrust to
distribution restraints in its 1977 Sylvania decision, which very largely
brought an end to antitrust condemnation of nonprice distribution
restraints.77 During the interval from Sylvania to Quanta, the Supreme
Court never considered a first sale case and thus never had the opportunity
to decide whether more lenient treatment of vertical nonprice restraints also
entailed some loosening of the first sale doctrine. In its Leegin decision in
2007, which overruled Dr. Miles, the Court rejected common law policies
against restraints on alienation as a justification for the per se rule against
RPM. Such rules, it said, reflected “formalistic line drawing” rather than
“demonstrable economic effect.”78 By contrast, the Quanta decision a year
later renewed the full-blown historical first sale doctrine with no mention
of competition policy or, for that matter, any policy whatsoever except
stare decisis.
Following the first sale doctrine, the Sherman Act created a second
body of federal law that could be applied to anticompetitive restrictions
on sale and use. While patents were not mentioned in the Act, its
passage occurred during a milieu of growing hostility toward big
business. Increasingly, patents came to be viewed as one of the principal
vehicles by which large firms perpetuated and extended their power.
Early in the twentieth century, both patent doctrine and antitrust law
evolved more aggressive and focused rules to deal with perceived
problems of patent overreaching. Much of this development occurred as
a result of the reaction to the Henry decision, which had held that a postsale tying condition on a patented good violated neither the first sale rule
nor the Sherman Act.79
While Henry’s formal demise did not occur until after § 3 of the
Clayton Act was passed in 1914, the Court largely undermined it and

76. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967) (“But to
allow this freedom where the manufacturer has parted with dominion over the goods—
the usual marketing situation—would violate the ancient rule against restraints on
alienation and open the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory further
than prudence permits.”); see also id. at 391 (Stewart, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Coke upon Littleton and accusing the majority of embracing a
legal rule “merely on grounds of its antiquity”).
77. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977).
78. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007)
(quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977)).
79. Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also supra notes 54–57
and accompanying text.
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restored the original first sale doctrine in 1913 in a RPM case. In Bauer,
decided a year after Henry, the Court held that the first sale doctrine
precluded a firm from using a patent license restriction to impose RPM on
a patented medicine called Sanatogen.80 The restriction was printed on each
package of the medicine with a warning that a violation would lead to a
patent infringement action.81 The Court had three choices: it could have
followed Bobbs-Merrill by holding that the first sale doctrine rendered the
RPM clause unenforceable, followed Henry by enforcing the restriction, or
followed Dr. Miles, then only two years old, by holding that the license
agreement amounted to an unlawful contract in restraint of trade.
The Court followed both Bobbs-Merrill and Dr. Miles. As far as the
first sale doctrine was concerned, the Court noted that Henry had
distinguished Bobbs-Merrill by observing that the Patent Act, unlike the
Copyright Act, gave the patentee the exclusive right to “use” its invention,
and the tying restriction was a restriction on how the machine could be
used.82 However, a price restriction is not a restriction on use; as a result,
the sale of a unit of the drug deprived the patentee of any right to control
the resale price of that unit.83 With respect to Dr. Miles, the Court observed
that it had declared that RPM agreements were contrary to public policy
and unenforceable.84 Of course, Congress had the power to create an
exception in the Patent Act, but there was no evidence that it had done so.
So Bauer was in fact a first sale decision, which observed consistency with
the policy of the Sherman Act.
The effective merger of the first sale rule and antitrust policy occurred
in two decisions issued on the same day in April 1917. Straus v. Victor
Talking Machine involved RPM, and the much better known Motion
Picture Patents decision involved a tying arrangement.85 The facts of
Straus suggest a ham-handed attempt to evade Dr. Miles, which had
condemned contractual RPM, and also Bauer, which had involved a postsale restraint on the sale of a patented product, by using what purported to
be a non-sale patent license instead. The patentee “licensed” a phonograph
80. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913).
81. Id. at 8:
This size package of Sanatogen is licensed by us for sale and use at a price not
less than one dollar ($1). Any sale in violation of this condition, or use when
so sold, will constitute an infringement of our patent No. 601,995, under which
Sanatogen is manufactured, and all persons so selling or using packages or
contents will be liable to injunction and damages.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id. at 15–16.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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machine to dealers, together with the right to “sublicense” the machine to
customers.86 The license restrictions included both a tying clause requiring
the use of the patentee’s needles and other supplies, and also a clause
stipulating the minimum price at which the machine could be transferred
from dealers to customers.87 While denominated a “license,” these transfers
of the phonograph resembled sales in every other respect. The patentee
brought a patent infringement action against a New York merchant who
undercut the stipulated price.88
The Court found that the scheme was “in substance, the one dealt with
by this court in Dr. Miles . . . and in Bauer” and that the license language
was a subterfuge to disguise what was in fact a sale.89 It then declared the
condition unenforceable, relying mainly on first sale cases extending back
to Adams v. Burke.90
Motion Picture Patents is far better known than Straus, and its
language is a swirl of ideas that determined the future course of the first
sale doctrine, misuse doctrine, and antitrust.91 In 1914 an angry Congress
responded to the Henry decision by passing § 3 of the Clayton Act,
which condemned anticompetitive ties, including those involving
patented tying products.92 In Motion Picture Patents the Supreme Court
overruled Henry. It also gave the first hints of what subsequently would
become the doctrine of patent “misuse,” an affirmative defense in a
patent infringement action that occurs when a patentee is said to have

86. Straus, 243 U.S. at 491.
87. Id. at 494–95.
88. Id. at 496.
89. Id. at 498.
90. Id. at 501 (citing Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873)); see
supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. A year later, in Boston Store of Chicago v.
American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918), the Supreme Court struck down under the
first sale doctrine a license restriction compelling resale price maintenance.
Since Dr. Miles had been written six years earlier, there was no question that a contract
imposing resale price maintenance was unlawful and unenforceable. But the Supreme Court
made clear that one could not accomplish the same purpose by means of a license restriction.
In so doing it applied the orthodox first sale rule, that:
by virtue of the patent law one who had sold a patented machine and received
the price and had thus placed the machine so sold beyond the confines of the
patent law, could not by qualifying restrictions as to use keep under the patent
monopoly a subject to which the monopoly no longer applied.
Straus, 243 U.S. at 24. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis protested that the legality of
resale price maintenance “is an economic question” which requires analysis of the market
facts. Id. at 28 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
91. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006).
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expanded the scope of its patent improperly.93
Motion Picture Patents condemned an arrangement under which
the seller of a theater motion picture projector limited its use to the
showing of the seller’s own films. The restriction was a lingering portion
of a failed attempt by interests who owned Thomas Edison’s projector and
film patents94 to monopolize the entire United States motion picture
industry. The attempt even included blacklisting actors and actresses who
had agreed to work on films produced by competitors of the Company.95
By the time the Supreme Court decided the case, the monopoly had fallen
apart. Nevertheless, the Clayton Act had been passed and the Court used
Motion Picture Patents as an opportunity to state that the new statute
“confirmed” its pre-Henry first sale cases.
Today Motion Picture Patents is widely treated as both an early
patent “misuse” decision96 as well as an antitrust decision.97 In fact, its

93. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–33 (1931)
(finding tying of dry ice to patented ice box constituted misuse and rejecting patentee’s
attempt to distinguish Motion Picture Patents by pointing out that, as in Henry, tied products
were essential to functioning of patented product); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 489 (1942) (tying of salt to salt injecting machine used by canners resulted in
misuse).
94. While not the earliest inventor, Edison was one of the earliest commercial
developers of the sprocketed projector take up wheel and film with little holes on the
side that engaged the sprocket, thus permitting the film to run smoothly and eliminating
the jerkiness that often appeared in very early motion pictures. Ownership of the
technology itself was disputed. See Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The
American Screen to 1907, at 130–80, in HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CINEMA (Charles
Harpole ed., Scribner’s 1990).
95. For background history on the business practices of the motion picture
industry, see MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY:
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 16–21 (1960); BENJAMIN B. HAMPTON, A HISTORY OF
THE MOVIES (THE LITERATURE OF CINEMA) 8–11, 17–24, 34, 64–76, 79–81 (1931);
LEWIS JACOBS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN FILM : A CRITICAL HISTORY, 1921–1947, at
81–85, 88, 164–65, 291–92 (1939).
96. See AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1781; HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW, ch. 3 (2d ed. 2010); ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 331 (rev. 4th ed. 2007)
(reprinting Motion Picture Patents as a misuse decision in the casebook); Bohannan, supra
note 21 (manuscript at 4); Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 904–06 (2007).
97. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517–18
(1917). In Motion Picture Patents, the Court stated it was “confirmed” in its conclusion by
the recently passed § 3 of the Clayton Act; its conclusion on the first sale doctrine, however,
made it “unnecessary to make the application of this statute to the case at bar.” Id. at 517.
Nevertheless, the Clayton Act provision was “a most persuasive expression of the public
policy of our country with respect to the question before us.” Id.
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analysis is mainly of patent “exhaustion,” or first sale. As the Court
wrote:
[T]he right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the
article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent
law and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may
attempt to put upon it. The statutory authority to grant the exclusive
right to ‘use’ a patented machine is not greater, indeed, it is precisely
the same, as the authority to grant the exclusive right to ‘vend,’ and,
looking to that authority, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we are
convinced that the exclusive right granted in every patent must be
limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, and that it
is not competent for the owner of a patent, by notice attached to its
machine, to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by
restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation, but
which are no part of the patented invention, or to send its machines
forth into the channels of trade of the country subject to conditions as
to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed thereafter at the discretion
of such patent owner. The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a
practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and annoyance to the public
which the opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it.98
B.

The First Sale Rule in the Development of Modern Competition Policy

As they became more refined and technical, the developing
doctrines of exhaustion, antitrust, and misuse all addressed practices
thought to be anticompetitive, such as tying, but they also moved in
different directions. Briefly:
The first sale rule, which was entirely judge-made in patent and
added to the copyright statute only in 1976,99 applied only to sales of the
patented or copyrighted good. The remedy was non-enforcement of the
restriction, or alternatively, a defense to an infringement action for
violating the restriction. As the Supreme Court summarized the doctrine
in its recent Quanta decision, the rule applies without any inquiry into

98. Id. at 515–16.
99. In copyright, Congress addressed the problem by expressly permitting parties
to contract around the first sale doctrine, but then limiting the parties to contract
remedies if they do so. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (stating first sale doctrine); House
Committee, Notes accompanying section 109(a), Notes of Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693; see
generally Bohannan, supra note 1; David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer
Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157
(1990) (discussing copy use license agreements as a method to contract around the first
sale doctrine).
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either competitive effects or innovative restraint.100
Misuse, another judge-made doctrine that was not fully developed
until the 1942 Morton Salt decision,101 could apply to both sales and
leases of a patented good as well as licenses; thus it applied in many
situations when the first sale doctrine would not. Misuse served as a
defense to an infringement action, but under Morton Salt the patent
became unenforceable against all infringers until such time as the misuse
was purged. The law developed antitrust-like criteria for determining
when patent misuse occurs, although current law reaches more broadly
in copyright misuse cases.102
If the appropriate anticompetitive effects are shown a restraint can
also violate the antitrust laws, passed by statute in 1890103 and 1914, 104
and provide the basis for an affirmative challenge by the government in
an equity case or by private plaintiffs seeking treble damages or an
injunction. The Clayton Act provision applies equally to the sale of
patented products, leases, and to licenses.105
In subsequent legal development, patent misuse law loosely tracked
antitrust principles. 106 Patent misuse has been a broader concept in the
case law, however, particularly in that of the Federal Circuit,107 and

100. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 630 (2008).
101. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942).
102. For more information on the scope of misuse, see Bohannan, supra note 21.
103. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–7, 26 Stat. 209, 209–10 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7 (2006)).
104. Primarily section 3 of the Clayton Act. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730,
731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006)).
105. See, e.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (condemning salt
tie); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (condemning a lease
requiring the lessees of tabulating machines to use the lessor’s punch cards).
106. See, e.g., AREEDA, ELHAUGE, & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1781 (advocating a
relatively close adherence to antitrust principles); HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE,
supra note 99, ch. 3, § 3.2 (noting that misuse doctrine is largely coextensive with antitrust
doctrine, though the Federal Circuit has held misuse doctrine to be broader); Cotter, supra
note 99, at 949–59 (arguing that misuse should follow antitrust principles). But see
Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 46) (arguing that misuse should apply when there is
an antitrust violation, an unreasonable restraint on innovation, or an unreasonable
sequestering of public domain information or technology).
107. See, e.g., Princo v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (finding proof of an antitrust violation insufficient to show misuse where the
conduct was not actually outside scope of the patent grant); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart,
803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding potential misuse for tying even though
antitrust’s “separate products”-requirement was not met); cf. Transitron Elec. Corp. v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 892 (D. Mass. 1980) (“[P]atent misuse may be seen
as having a less stringent standing requirement and a lesser burden of proof than an antitrust
claim.”), aff’d, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981). Contra USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., 694 F.2d
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copyright misuse is broader still.108 The first sale doctrine has never been
cabined in this way, and under Quanta applies without any query into
harmful effects. So the operative distinctions are that the first sale
doctrine is substantively broader, reaching even conditions not seen as
anticompetitive or in violation of antitrust law or as restraints on
innovation. However, the doctrine is more limited in the sense that it
applies only to the authorized sale of a patented or copyrighted article,
not to leases or licenses.
The result is far too much doctrine, pointing in too many different
directions. Further, the first sale doctrine fails to address in any
comprehensive way the two policy concerns that should be fundamental
to the analysis of such restraints. First, they must not impair competition
unreasonably, with “competition” defined as the state of affairs when
prices are kept close to cost and output is maximized. Second, they must
not serve unreasonably to restrain innovation or sequester the public
domain. Antitrust policy is concerned with competition but has had great
difficulty developing good theory about when such restraints are
anticompetitive. By contrast, both the first sale rule and IP misuse are
thought of as developing within IP, where the underlying goal is to
further innovation. But facilitation of innovation has never been
articulated as a goal of first sale doctrine.
In its pre-Quanta case law the Supreme Court had developed
rationales for the first sale doctrine other than limiting restraints on
alienation. These concerns then bled into both antitrust policy and the IP
law of foreclosure.
1.

Multiple Royalties and Leveraging

One historical concern that the courts raised in first sale cases was
that permitting the patentee to place post-sale license restrictions on
patented goods would entitle the patentee to collect multiple royalties.
This concern appeared and reappeared in the law of the first sale
doctrine and later merged into both the doctrine of patent misuse and the
antitrust law of tying arrangements. As early as 1863 the Supreme Court
declared that the first sale doctrine was essential because patentees:
505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding patent misuse should be addressed under antitrust
principles), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
108. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046,
at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009) (recognizing possible copyright misuse claim even though
antitrust claim had been dismissed); Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc.,
350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting copyright misuse could be found without an
antitrust violation); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978–79 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding copyright misuse without any corresponding violation of antitrust law); see also
Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 13–14).
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are entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine, and
consequently when a patentee has himself constructed the machine and
sold it, or authorized another to construct and sell it, or to construct and
use and operate it, and the consideration has been paid to him for the
right, he has then to that extent parted with his monopoly, and ceased to
have any interest whatever in the machine so sold or so authorized to be
constructed and operated. 109
That concern was most recently stated by the now vindicated
district court decision in Quanta, which justified the first sale doctrine as
prohibiting “double” royalties.110
This concern about double monopoly profits was largely the same
as the concern that drove patent tying misuse cases, as well as those
involving contractual extensions of royalty-like payments. For example,
in the Carbice decision, which applied the first sale doctrine but was
treated later as a misuse case, Justice Brandeis opined that a patentee’s
tie of a refrigerated transport box to its dry ice refrigerant was bad
because it enabled the patentee to earn a monopoly profit not merely on
the box but also on the unpatented ice.111 And in Brulotte v. Thys, which
applied patent misuse doctrine, Justice Douglas declared that contracts
requiring post-expiration payments akin to royalties were bad because
they enabled the patentee to multiply the amount of royalties that it
could receive: “[T]o use that leverage [of the patent] to project those
109. Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863); see also United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (determination of exhaustion rests on “whether or
not there has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee
has received his reward for the use of the article”).
110. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C 01-00326 CW, 2002 WL
31996860, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug 20, 2002) (first sale doctrine “designed to prevent a patentee
from receiving a double royalty on a single patented invention”), clarified by 248 F. Supp.
2d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d sub nom. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d sub. nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S.
617 (2008). On the question of whether a sale was “authorized,” see Gen. Talking Pictures
Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126 (1938) (“[A]s [buyer] ordered, purchased and
leased [patented products from licensee] knowing [licensee was not authorized to sell for
that purpose], [buyer] also was an infringer.”).
111. Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931) (internal
citations omitted) (opining that patent tie enabled
[T]he patent-owner to “derive its profit, not from the invention on which the
law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented supplies with which it is
used” [and which are] “wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly.” If a
monopoly could be so expanded, the owner of a patent for a product might
conceivably monopolize the commerce in a large part of [the] unpatented
materials used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine might
thereby secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies consumed in its
operation.).
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royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort
to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tying the sale or use of the
patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.”112
In the 1950s, this leverage theory of monopoly tying was largely
discredited by Chicago School writers, who showed that a monopolist of
a product that uses complements or that is subject to further downstream
sales can earn all of the available monopoly profits in the initial sale of
the primary monopoly product itself.113 Or to say this differently, in any
multi-stage distribution chain there is but a single monopoly profit to be
earned. For example, customers’ willingness-to-pay for the ice box in
the Carbice case is a function of their willingness-to-pay for the ice box
and dry ice combination. One who sells both products together can
charge the monopoly price for one or the other or spread it over some
combination of the two. But it cannot charge the full monopoly price for
the box, predicated on a competitive price for the ice, and then charge a
second monopoly price for the ice.
The first sale doctrine was historically justified by a variation of the
leverage theory, but the Chicago School showed that one who owns a
patented good subject to subsequent downstream resales or uses as a
component in another product can charge a price in the primary
transaction that gives it the full markup that is available from
downstream purchasers or other users. To illustrate, suppose the patentee
sells a patented microprocessor to Alpha Company, which places the
chip on a memory circuit board and then sells the board to Beta
Company, which installs the board as a component in a computer.114 The
patentee might be able to collect a $5 royalty from Alpha and use the
license restriction to obtain an additional $3 royalty from Beta.
Alternatively, it could charge the entire $8 markup to Alpha, who
presumably would pass on the $3 charge in its transaction with Beta. But
assuming that the profit-maximizing value of the royalties in this
distribution chain is $8 for a single monopolist, the patentee could not
profitably charge an $8 royalty to Alpha plus the $3 royalty to Beta. The
first sale doctrine would require the patentee to obtain the entire $8
112. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
113. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1958); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §10.6a (3d ed. 2005). For a recent attempt to restore
a version of the leverage theory, see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 409–10, 431 n.89
(2009). For a reply defending the established arguments against leveraging, see
Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9.
114. The facts loosely track those of the Quanta decision. See Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 623–24 (2008).
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royalty charge from Alpha, leaving Alpha free to charge whatever it
needed to in its secondary transaction with Beta, but the profit earned by
patentee is substantially the same either way.
2.

Transaction Costs, Holdup, and Notice

In the simple story the first sale doctrine reduces downstream
transaction costs: the patentee obtains its entire $8 in its initial
transaction with Alpha, the first purchaser. If it obtains only $5 from
Alpha it must then search out Beta, who purchases subsequently from
Alpha, in order to collect the additional $3 of royalty that its patent
position makes available. Further, the firms in Beta’s position might be
numerous and perhaps hard to identify. Indeed, spreading out the royalty
obligation can create information costs on both sides. First, it may be
difficult and costly for the patentee to identify the firms in Beta’s
position—certainly more difficult than simply charging the full royalty
in the initial transaction with Alpha. Of course, to the extent this is a
problem it seems to be self-correcting. Why would the patentee divide
its royalty between Alpha and the Betas if it believed it would ultimately
not be able to find and collect the full value of the Betas’ royalty
obligations? It would accordingly charge the full royalty to Alpha and
leave Alpha to pass on whatever it could in its transactions with Beta.
The story on the other side of the transaction is somewhat different,
particularly in a market in which license terms are difficult to discover.
Suppose that the patentee assesses the post-sale license requirement in
its initial transaction with Alpha but that subsequent Betas purchasing
from Alpha do not all have notice of the restriction. They may pay Alpha
too much because they find out only after the transaction has been
consummated that they also owe $3 to the patentee. The fact that
subsequent purchasers did not know about the restriction is generally not
a defense in a patent infringement action. 115 As a result, they will take
more of the patentee’s chip than they would otherwise have purchased,
or they may forego a rival’s chip that would have been a better choice
had they known the true cost of this patentee’s chip.
An ineffectively communicated post-sale restriction can yield
overconsumption by indirect purchasers because they did not have
adequate notice of the restriction at the time they purchased the
115. Patent liability is a strict liability offense and lack of knowledge of the patent
is not a defense; in cases of license restrictions, it essentially means the potential
infringer has no license and therefore is guilty of infringement. Cf. Mark A. Lemley,
Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007);
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to patent Infringement, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 475 (2006); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (May 2006).
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technology. This problem is potentially quite serious given that patent
licenses, as opposed to patents themselves, are not recorded and
publicized in a searchable form.116 If the patentee can catch downstream
violators by surprise it will be in a position to extract much higher
royalty rates than it could if the infringement notification were more
timely. 117 For example, computer assemblers selecting components from
Intel without notice of the conditional sale from LG to Intel would make
that choice on the premise that all IP rights necessary for the use of such
products traveled with the sale. That would affect their decision to use
Intel components rather than those of a rival. However, they might find
out later that they owe another royalty to LG, only after they have made
structural commitments to Intel’s technology.
One reason for post-sale infringement claims, as in the Quanta
case, may be to defer royalty negotiation until after the purchaser has
made a commitment from which reversal is costly. If the patentee were
required to charge its full royalty to the initial purchaser, who is
uncommitted as to technology and in competition with others, then the
royalty charged would reflect quite a different set of market realities. 118
But this problem can be addressed by making timely notice a
condition of enforcement, which was the approach that Justice Lurton

116. See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2022 (2007); Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Patent
Restrictions After Mallinckrodt – An Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1,
12–19 (1994).
117. The situation is analogous to the patent holdup problem that occurs when a
participant in a standard setting process surreptitiously files patent continuations on a
previously existing patent, writing on technology that the standard setting organization is in
the process of adopting, and surprising them with its patent after participants are locked in.
See, e.g., Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C., Aug. 2, 2006), vacated, 522
F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009); see also Hynix
Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (refusing
to strike pre-trial jury demand with respect to above described claims); Union Oil Co. of
Calif., No. 9305, 2004 FTC LEXIS 115 (F.T.C., July 7, 2004) (discussing liability for
misrepresentations made to a state agency in the process of promulgating standards); PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 712 (3d ed. 2008); JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK 62–65 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse
of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 79 n.62 (2004).
118. Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2, at 29 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“If . . . [a] producer learns that it has
infringed a patent only after it has committed sunk costs to its . . . production—and [is] thus
locked in to the effort—the patentee may be in a position to demand supra-competitive
royalty rates.”).
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took for the Supreme Court in Henry. Although the Court set the first
sale rule aside under the circumstances of that case, he limited
infringement actions to situations where the purchaser had “notice that
he buys with only a qualified right of use. He has a right to assume, in
the absence of knowledge, that the seller passes an unconditional title to
the machine, with no limitations upon the use . . . .”119 As noted later, the
law of real property servitudes requires either privity of contract or
effective and timely notice as a prerequisite to enforcement, 120 and IP
law should do the same.
In Henry, as in Motion Picture Patents, a notice of the requirement
that purchasers of the machine use only the patentee’s aftermarket
products was attached to the machine,121 so one can assume that the
original purchaser of the machine had notice. Subsequent purchasers
probably had notice as well, assuming that the notice had not been
removed. What made Henry interesting, however, was that Henry
himself was not a purchaser of the machine at all, but rather a stationer
who sold ink to the machine’s owner with knowledge and the
“expectation” that the ink would be used in the machine in conflict with
the notice restriction.122 That makes the Henry facts a little unusual,
because ordinarily an office supply store selling ink would not be in a
position to know what kind of notice is printed on an ink-consuming
machine back at the purchaser’s office. A breach of contract action
against Henry would not have worked, since he was not in privity of
contract with A.B. Dick. Presumably, the Supreme Court would not have
permitted A.B. Dick to pursue its infringement claim in the more typical
case where the seller of a commodity had no knowledge of precisely
how it was going to be used. However, the law of contributory
infringement, unlike the law of direct infringement, does require notice,
and clearly did so require when Henry was decided. 123
In Adams, where the Supreme Court first developed the first sale
rule, it did not discuss notice, although the lower court appeared to
assume that notice existed. 124 In Bobbs-Merrill, which applied the first
119. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also supra text
accompanying notes 56–60.
120. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
121. Henry, 224 U.S. at 11.
122. Id. at 11–12.
123. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). On the requirement in the early twentieth
century, see Cortelyou v. Charles E. Johnson & Co., 145 F. 933, 935–37 (2d Cir. 1906)
(dismissing contributory infringement claim because defendant lacked notice of
restriction), aff’d, 207 U.S. 196 (1907).
124. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Adams v. Burks, 1 F. Cas.
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sale rule, the license restriction limiting the resale price was printed in
the copies of each book, so the subsequent seller clearly had notice of it,
as the Court’s opinion observed. 125 In the Federal Circuit’s more recent
Mallinckrodt decision, more or less following Henry, the infringement
defendant had actual knowledge of the “single use only” restriction that
it violated. 126 Because notice was not in dispute the court left for another
day the question of what type of notice would be sufficient; clearly,
however, it assumed that notice of some type was necessary.127
Most recently, in Quanta the first purchaser of the patented chip,
Intel, had signed an agreement with the patentee promising to give
notice to its own downstream purchasers about the restriction on use of
the patented product in conjunction with non-Intel parts.128 The Court
also observed that Quanta, the downstream purchaser against whom the
post-sale restraint would have been imposed, purchased with actual
notice of the restriction. 129 The Court applied the first sale doctrine and
refused to enforce the restraint notwithstanding the notice.130
To the extent that post-sale restraints have any social value, the first
sale rule seems to be an excessive way of addressing any problem of
lack of notice and the patent holdup that results. A much better solution
would be to give the patentee the incentive to ensure that any person
upon whom a post-sale restraint will be imposed has notice of the
restraint prior to making a commitment from which extraction would be
costly. The Federal Circuit recently adopted such an approach in a
different setting, holding that one who lied about patents during a
standard setting process in which its patented technology was adopted
would later be equitably stopped from asserting those patents against the
covered standard.131 In the first sale context, the patentee would not be
able to maintain its infringement suit against a subsequent purchaser or
another who did not have objectively reasonable notice. If the original
purchaser breached an agreement to provide notice to downstream
100 (C.C. Mass. 1871) (No. 50); see also supra notes 37– 39 and accompanying text.
125. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 342 (1908); see also supra notes
40–42 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s brief opinion in Cortelyou v.
Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196 (1907), dismissed an infringement suit
whose facts were similar to Henry, because the defendant lacked notice of the restriction.
The action was one of contributory infringement, however, which has its own
independent notice requirement. See id. at 199.
126. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
127. Id. at 706.
128. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 623–24 (2008).
129. Id. at 624.
130. Id. at 637–38.
131. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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purchasers, then the appropriate remedy would be a breach of contract
action against the first purchaser.
The real property law of servitudes has coped quite well with a land
use system that recognizes the value of both contract and remote (i.e.,
nonprivity) claims as enforcement vehicles. For example, suppose I sell
you a parcel of land adjacent to my house, and impose on it a post-sale
restraint that the land never be used for commercial purposes. This
restriction can be enforced either as a “real covenant” or an “equitable
servitude.” The classic law of real covenants is contractual in nature and
depends on privity—either privity of contract if the agreement is being
enforced between the original parties, or “privity of estate,” which acts
as a substitute when one of the parcels of land has been transferred. For
example, if you resold the parcel to X, who then began building a
gasoline station on the property, I could enforce the covenant against X
by showing that the restriction is contractual and that the transfer of the
land from you to X created privity of estate between X and me, which
would then substitute for privity of contract.132
However, privity would not be necessary if I had placed the nocommercial-use covenant in the deed and the deed had been properly
recorded. In that case the restriction could be enforced as an equitable
servitude against anyone with actual or constructive notice of the
restraint, and privity would not matter.133 Most courts hold that the
servitude must be properly recorded in the chain of title of all persons
against whom subsequent enforcement is sought. 134 The reasoning is
fairly simple: it is much cheaper to record an interest in a known chain
of title than it is to search many unknown ones. The same reasoning can
be applied in the IP context. For example, the purchaser of a coffin
would have to track down every patent covering it, determine whether
the patent was still enforceable, and then query whether in some prior
transfer to a component manufacturer the patentee had imposed a postsale restraint.
If post-sale restraints serve potentially valuable functions and the
132. See, e.g., SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY
LAW 623–755 (5th ed. 2007).
133. Trustees of Columbia Coll. v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877) (enforcing recorded
agreement between predecessors in title to build only single family homes on their
respective lots, notwithstanding lack of privity); see also KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 132, at 623–755.
134. See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Conn. Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286, 290
(2d Cir. 1984); Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 340–41 (N.Y. 1991); Basore v.
Johnson, 689 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). For the analogy to patents, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596789.
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only objection to post-sale restraints is that they can take subsequent
users or purchasers by surprise, a notice requirement seems much more
suitable to the problem than the more draconian route of forbidding such
restraints altogether.
3.

Intermediate Technology Transfers and Method Patents

Even under the expansive definition of the first sale doctrine
revitalized in Quanta, not every post-transfer restraint on IP is
unenforceable. The doctrine may not apply to “intermediate” transfers of
IP rights, in particular when the transfer does not include any patented
article at all, but only a license to manufacture.
Under the logic of the Supreme Court’s first sale decisions, when
the patentee sells a patented article it gives up its power as to that
particular unit and only that unit. The patentee still controls the patent
and other copies of the article that it may choose to make. By contrast,
when the patentee licenses production rights to someone else there is no
inherent limit on the number of patented articles that the licensee can
make or what their disposition will be. That means that post-transfer
conditions are essential and generally enforceable, including by means
of infringement actions, unless they are anticompetitive or in violation of
patent policy. However, the transfer of a single unit of a good subject to
a further process covered by a method patent is still no more than a
transfer of a single unit, and the scope of the restraint is limited
accordingly. 135
Under these principles:
1. Under the first sale doctrine, when a finished patented article is sold
to the first purchaser the patentee’s interests in that copy of the article
are at an end; any limitations on further disposition of the article are
governed by contract law and state public policy concerning restraints
on alienation.
2. When the patentee sells an unfinished article that requires
application of the patentee’s method patents in order to make that
particular copy of the article useable or marketable the first sale
135. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-251 (1942) (sale
of an uncompleted article together with implied license to method patent to finish
it exhausted the patentee’s right ”so far as it is or may be embodied in that
particular article”). Contrast this with the Federal Circuit’s rather categorical holding that
method patents are not subject to exhaustion. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453
F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (relying on Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174
F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), rev’d sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
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doctrine also applies. Further, both the technology embodied in the
article and the process patents needed to finish it are exhausted as to
that copy. That is the only way to make sense of the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Quanta that the first sale decision applies to method
patents.136 One way to view this problem is to say that the sale of the
unfinished good requiring further application of the defendant’s
patented method carries with it an implied license to the purchaser to
finish that particular copy of the good, and exhaustion applies to both
the article and the attached method license.137
3. When the subject of the license is not a finished or semi-finished
article but rather a general license to use the patentee’s method,
process, or technology to produce articles “in gross,” the first sale
doctrine does not ordinarily apply to the licensing of the process itself.
However, if the patentee places restraints on the disposition of articles
made by the licensee under the patent, the sale of those goods exhausts
the patent with respect to them; that is, authorized sales of the article
by the licensee are also subject to exhaustion with respect to the article
sold.
These rules rest on principles that date back to Blackstone’s
distinction between land interests “appurtenant” and “in gross,”
particularly in relation to commons property. As Blackstone observed, if
farmers share grazing rights on commons that is appurtenant to their
own farms, then their use is naturally limited: they cannot graze more
cattle on the commons than their own farms support. However, if they
own commons “in gross,” or personally, then there is no natural limit on
their use of the common right, and artificial limits have to be imposed. 138
Blackstone’s distinction is applied today in the law of real property
easements and covenants. An easement appurtenant is attached to and
benefits a particular piece of land and cannot be used except to benefit

136. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628–29 (2008).
137. Cf. Julia E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 30–35 (2001) (discussing implied licenses and
exhaustion in the context of reverse engineering).
138. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *237–38:
Another disturbance of common is by surcharging it; or putting more cattle
therein than the pasture and herbage will sustain, or the party hath a right to do.
In this case he that surcharges does an injury to the rest of the owners, by
depriving them of their respective portions, or at least contracting them into a
smaller compass. This injury by surcharging can properly speaking only
happen, where the common is appendant or appurtenant, and of course
limitable by law; or where, when in gross, it is expressly limited and certain:
for where a man hath common in gross . . . he cannot be a surcharger.
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that land. 139 By contrast, an easement in gross is personal to the grantor,
creating the possibility of excessive use. The common law responded by
making easements in gross indivisible,140 while an easement appurtenant
could be divided when the dominant estate to which it was attached was
divided. 141
The sale of an unfinished article along with the implied license to
finish it is akin to an easement appurtenant, which creates a license to
improve or finish, but only with respect to the article being transferred.
By contrast, the mere license of the right to make a good is incorporeal
and could be used without limit unless limits are expressly attached to it.
The first sale rule properly applies to the sale of the unfinished good
with the single use license because the only thing that is taken from the
patentee is the patent protection with respect to that unit. Exhaustion
does not properly apply to the incorporeal interest, however, because
once the interest is created there is nothing inherent in it that prevents
the licensee’s rights from swallowing up the whole. In Adams v. Burke,
for example, the patentee could license another to manufacture coffin
lids and place any territorial limits he pleased. That is the way a patentee
could organize production in conjunction with its licensee. 142 But he
could not sell a finished lid subject to a territorial limitation on where it
could be used, and if the lid were unfinished and required a patent
license in order to finish it, he could not place a territorial limitation on
the process insofar as it covered that particular lid.
The first sale rule thus served to distinguish situations in which the
patentee was able to appropriate the value of the invention from those in
which it was not.143 A pure manufacturing license without a postcontract restriction would place no limit on the licensee’s ability to
produce as much as it wished and sell wherever and to whomever it
139. See, e.g., Penn Bowling Recreation Center v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64, 66
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (applying common law rule forbidding owner of an easement in gross from
using it to benefit lands other than the dominant estate).
140. See, e.g., Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass’n, 200 A. 646, 651 (Pa.
1938). The classic discussion is Lord Mountjoy’s Case, [1583] 78 Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B.),
which held that an interest in gross could not be divided unless the multiple parties operated
it as “one stock,” that is, a single enterprise such as a joint venture or partnership. For a
detailed application of the decision in the United States, see Chandler v. Hart, 119 P. 516,
520–22 (Cal. 1911); see also Lewis Mallalieu Simes, The Assignability of Easements in
Gross in American Law, 22 MICH. L. REV. 521, 528 (1924).
141. See, e.g., Martin v. Music, 254 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1953).
142. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
143. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 125–27, 297–306 (2003); Yonatan Even,
Appropriability, First Sale & Exhaustion (Sept. 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1274822.
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pleased. By contrast, when a single copy of the patented good is sold, the
patentee is able to appropriate the full value of that copy in the purchase
price. Purchase of a single unit does not permit the buyer to make other
copies or license others to make copies; it does not even permit buyers to
“reconstruct” the patented good when it wears out.144
Of course, this is an argument for permitting post-sale restraints on
manufacturing licenses; it is not necessarily an argument for prohibiting
post-sale restraints on the sale of individual copies of goods that are
protected by IP rights. The rationale for the prohibition requires some
reason why they are socially harmful.
The Supreme Court’s decisions involving transfers of intermediate
patent rights—that is, something falling short of the finished good—are
consistent with these Blackstonian principles. First, the Court’s 1926
decision in United States v. General Electric Co. held that a patentee’s
pure manufacturing license did not exhaust any rights in the patent. 145
GE sold Westinghouse a license to manufacture light bulbs covered by
its patent; GE did not sell Westinghouse the light bulbs themselves. The
Court held that GE could stipulate the price at which Westinghouse sold
those bulbs to consumers. Thus even a RPM agreement—per se
unlawful at the time as a matter of antitrust law146—would be upheld if it
was found to be within the patent grant.
Both Univis Lens and General Talking Pictures involved more
complex arrangements, including transfers of an intermediate article and
a license to apply a patented process.147 The Supreme Court applied the
first sale doctrine in the first case but not the second. 148
In Univis, the Supreme Court’s most recent application of the first
sale rule prior to Quanta, the defendant patentee sold lens blanks for use
in bifocal eyeglasses. The lens blanks were not useable in glasses as
sold, but had to be ground to meet the wearer’s prescription needs before

144. In general, the purchaser of a patented good may repair it but not
“reconstruct” it. Making the distinction has proven extraordinarily difficult. See, e.g.,
Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102–05 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(discussing the differences with respect to patented disposable cameras intended for a
single use but technologically capable of being refurbished).
145. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926) (first sale doctrine did
not apply to restriction placed on manufacturing licensee as opposed to one who purchased
the patented product).
146. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
147. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Gen. Talking Pictures
Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
148. See Univis, 316 U.S. at 250; Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 305 U.S. at 127.
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they could be mounted into frames.149 Univis’ patents extended not only
to the lenses but also to the grinding technology used by purchasers of
the raw lenses.150 Univis sold the lens blanks subject to a RPM
restriction that the Court ultimately found unlawful, but only after an
intermediate finding that the restriction violated the first sale rule. 151
The Supreme Court conceded that the patented article was not
“finished” and was necessarily subject to future refinements that were
also covered by Univis’ patents. Nevertheless, “the only use to which it
could be put and the only object of the sale is to enable the latter to grind
and polish it for use as a lens by the prospective wearer.”152 That is,
implicit in the sale of the lens blank was a right given to the purchaser to
employ Univis’ grinding technology in order to turn that particular blank
into a marketable set of eyeglasses. The right to finish was
“appurtenant,” in Blackstone’s terminology, to the particular copy of the
patented article that the purchaser bought.153 The process license and the
blanks were tied together in a one-to-one ratio. Key to the Court’s
decision was that the lens blank was useless unless subjected to the
defendant’s patented method for grinding it into a finished lens. In that
case, it saw the purchase of the unfinished lens as “inherently” including
the right to complete the process needed in order to bring the lens to
market. 154
149. Univis, 316 U.S. at 244–45.
150. Id. at 249.
151. Id. at 250–52.
152. Id. at 249.
153. See id. at 251:
Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law is
fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received
his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the article, and that once
that purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use
and enjoyment of the thing sold . . . . Whether the licensee sells the patented
article in its completed form or sells it before completion for the purpose of
enabling the buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally parted with the article,
and made it the vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of the invention
with respect to that article. To that extent he has parted with his patent
monopoly in either case, and has received in the purchase price every benefit
of that monopoly which the patent law secures to him.
154. See id. at 249:
. . . it is plain that where the sale of the blank is by the patentee or his
licensee—here the Lens Company—to a finisher, the only use to which it
could be put and the only object of the sale is to enable the latter to grind and
polish it for use as a lens by the prospective wearer. An incident to the
purchase of any article, whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use and
sell it, and upon familiar principles the authorized sale of an article which is
capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent
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The analogy has been applied to software patents. While making a
copy of a patented article is typically infringement, one cannot use
computer software without making a temporary copy of part of the
software code. This code resides in the computer while the software is
being used. Prohibiting such “copying” would effectively make the
software useless.155 But consistent with Univis, software that was sold
subject to this implied license could itself be subject to the first sale
doctrine, prohibiting the patentee from imposing post-sale restraints via
the threat of infringement actions.156
In contrast, the Supreme Court presented General Talking Pictures
as concerned not with the sale of a patented device, but rather with a
license to manufacture a finished combination, in this case a sound
system subject to a post-sale field-of-use restriction for noncommercial
use. 157 The Court upheld the restriction with scant reference to the first
sale doctrine. 158 The Court distinguished earlier first sale cases in two
ways: (1) as in General Electric,159 the patentee did not sell a patented
product to the first buyer but rather licensed that buyer to manufacture
the patented product, subject to the field-of-use restriction; (2) the
licensee then sold the finished product without restriction in violation of
the license agreement. As a result of (2), the first sale of a completed
good in the transaction was not “authorized” by the patentee, and thus
the first sale rule did not attach.160
monopoly with respect to the article sold.
See also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980) (implicitly
accepting that sale of unpatented chemical with no use other than that in conjunction with
the seller’s patented method exhausted method patent with respect to that combination);
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 452 (1940) (finding that first sale rule
covered gasoline additive and method patent for burning it).
155. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 140, at 32. For a discussion of the problems
involved in treating the automatic copy-making as direct patent infringement, see Keith E.
Witek, Software Patent Infringement on the Internet and on Modern Computer Systems—
Who Is Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 303, 369–71
(1998).
156. Of course, breach of contract suits for violations of a valid license agreement
might still be possible. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). The
ProCD decision has not been without its critics, however. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 1,
at 632 (criticizing ProCD for sweeping too broadly); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:
The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 147–50 (1999)
(criticizing ProCD decision for failure to confront preemption issue).
157. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
158. See id. at 125–27.
159. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
160. In a strong dissent Justice Black, joined by Justice Reed, argued that the first sale
doctrine should have applied. See Gen. Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 128 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, according to the district court’s opinion the licensee purchased vacuum
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Another distinction between Univis and General Talking Pictures is
more relevant to competition policy. Univis involved a restriction on the
resale price that resellers of the patented lenses were required to charge.
At the time resale price maintenance was unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act.161 Read together, Univis and the Supreme Court’s 1926
General Electric case stand for two propositions. First Univis declares
that one may not sell a good, even if unfinished, and impose RPM on
resellers, if the unfinished good has no use unless the patented process is
applied to it; in that case the license is appurtenant to the good. By
contrast, a pure manufacturing license that is not appurtenant to the sale
of a good fails to exhaust the patent and thus the licensor is free to
impose additional limits enforceable by infringement actions. However
one characterizes the transaction in General Talking Pictures, the fieldof-use restraint at issue was a vertical nonprice restraint, and the
Supreme Court had not yet determined the appropriate antitrust response
to these. 162
The Federal Circuit largely disregarded these distinctions when it
concluded quite categorically that when a patented good is subject to
further application of a patented method the transaction is not subject to
the first sale doctrine, for sale of the device does not exhaust the
patentee’s interest in it. 163 In its Quanta decision, the Supreme Court
categorically held that the first sale doctrine applies to method patents
attached to an article or device with almost no discussion of the policy

tubes manufactured by the patentee and the boxes containing the tubes bore the challenged
field-of-use restriction. See W. Elec. Co. v. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293,
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). It then manufactured the amplifiers employing these tubes, under
license from the patentee. It appears that the tubes could be used in any amplifier
manufactured by the patentee as well as the amplifiers of others. The Government
emphasized this point in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Quanta. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 3353102.
161. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
162. Antitrust challenges to vertical nonprice restraints emerged in the early 1960’s,
after which the Court changed its mind twice. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (declining to condemn vertical nonprice restraints); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (condemning vertical nonprice restraints under
per se rule), overruled by Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977)
(overruling Schwinn and applying rule of reason to vertical nonprice restraints instead of per
se rule).
163. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
rev’d sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Glass Equip.
Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Bandag, Inc. v. Al
Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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implications.164 Neither line of decisions does much to illuminate the
important issues.
4.

Mallinckrodt and the Durability Problem

The Federal Circuit’s now overruled Mallinckrodt decision had
departed from Supreme Court precedent by permitting a patentee to
enforce a post-sale restraint on some patented articles by distinguishing
unconditional from conditional sales.165 Further, the condition could be
enforced by either a breach of contract action or a patent infringement
action.166
The restriction in question prohibited the purchaser of a medical
device from reusing it.167 Although such a restriction could have
different explanations, it was very possibly the patentee’s attempt to
address a durable goods problem. 168 The monopolist or oligopolist tries
to avoid durability because it fears that its own product will come back
to compete with itself. As a result it may resort to such tactics as leasing
rather than selling its output.169 For example, in United Shoe
Machinery,170 Xerox,171 and IBM, 172 when they controlled the markets in
164. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628–30.
165. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
166. See id. at 701.
167. The decision seems directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision a century
earlier in American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882), where the Court
applied the first sale doctrine to invalidate a patentee’s restriction on reuse of a belt
buckle subject to a single use limitation.
168. For one early observation of the problem, see Edward H. Chamberlin, The
Product as an Economic Variable, 67 Q.J. ECON. 1, 23–24 (1953), observing that,
[B]ecause durability can be varied, a producer has to face the question of how
durable to make his product. Evidently if he makes it too durable, as soon as
people have bought one unit they will not need another for a substantial period
during which there will be no “repeat demand” for his product. He has an
interest then in making it less durable so that people will come back that much
sooner . . . .
For a comprehensive review and critique, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle:
Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (2004).
169. See Ronald H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972); see
also Michael Waldman, Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
131 (2003).
170. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 297 (D.Mass.
1953), aff’d mem., 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). For a critique, see Scott E. Masten &
Edward A. Snyder, United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: on the
Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33 (1993).
171. See In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 364 (1975); Timothy F. Bresnahan, PostEntry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier Market, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 15, 16 (1985).
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their respective durable products, they leased rather than sold them. In
that case no competitive market arises for the used good. In a perfectly
competitive market, competition would force the firms to sell if selling
were cost effective and what customers wanted.
In a well-functioning market the patentee monopolist should be
able to capture the full value of all downstream uses and reuses of its
good—that is, the purchaser who intends to use it multiple times would
be willing to pay the present value of repeated future uses, less
anticipated costs.173 Of course, these incentives may be altered in
markets with agency problems such as third-party payment, which
characterizes the medical industry generally.
One possible justification for the single use only restriction rests on
the observation that inherent in the patent grant is the right to limit
output. A patentee has the right to produce any amount of the patented
good it pleases, right down to zero.174 A single use restriction is in fact a
type of output reduction. At its choosing, the patentee could make 1000
copies of its good or 100. If it makes 100, it can impose a single use
restriction, thus limiting the right of purchasers to turn that 100 into 200
or more by using each copy two or more times.
But single use restrictions can be more harmful than simple output
restrictions because they consume actual resources. Suppose a patented
good is capable of being used twice before it wears out and under
competition 1000 copies of the good, or 2000 uses, would be sold.
Suppose further, however, that the patentee maximizes its profits by
cutting output back to 1000 uses and setting a higher royalty rate. It
could attain this result either by (1) producing 500 copies of the good
without a restriction, leading each customer to use a copy twice; or (2)
producing 1000 copies of the good but imposing a single use restriction
on each. While both alternatives yield 1000 uses, the second one
consumes more resources. In that case the single use restriction is a
socially harmful solution to the durability problem. It not only prevents
the rise of a used goods market but limits the use of each good to a
single cycle.
Of course, to the extent such conduct is costly, it would also seem

172. United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68, 245
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); FRANKLIN M. FISHER, ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN U.S. V. IBM 191–95 (1983).
173. See Wolfhard Ramm, On the Durability of Capital Goods Under Imperfect
Market Conditions, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1974).
174. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908)
(patentee has right to bring infringement action even though it is not practicing the patent
in question).
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to be self-deterring. Why would the manufacturer produce 1000 units of
the good subject to single use restrictions when it could obtain the same
price by producing 500 units and permitting customers to use them
twice? Further, there might be perfectly good technological reasons for
such a limitation. Perhaps the device would be hazardous or unreliable if
reused and could not effectively be refurbished. The defendant in
Mallinckrodt apparently thought otherwise, for it was in the business of
refurbishing the medical device in question, and hospitals were willing
to purchase the refurbished units. The patentee stated that there were
reasons related to health and liability for prohibiting reuse, but the
Federal Circuit found it unnecessary to inquire into the merits of these
explanations.175
By not asking whether the restraint on reuse was technologically
justified, the Federal Circuit effectively concluded that the patent grant
contained within it the power to force post-sale users to use the product
inefficiently. This social cost would undoubtedly be largest if

175. The device in question delivered therapeutic radioactive material into the lungs in
the form of an aerosol mist, as part of a treatment for pulmonary disease. Use of the device
contaminated it with the radioactive materials as well as other possibly harmful materials,
and refurbishing included a radiation sterilization process. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc., 976 F.2d 701, 701–02 (1992). The Federal Circuit went on to reverse the lower court’s
summary judgment ruling that the patents were unenforceable based on the single use
restriction. Id. at 709.
The Lexmark print cartridge litigation also addressed single use restrictions and
refurbishment. The restrictions in that case were originally allowed. See Ariz. Cartridge
Remanufacturers Ass’n, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2005)
(upholding patentee’s restriction on its printer cartridges, requiring the cartridges be returned
after single use in exchange for price discount); accord Static Control Components, Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830, 847–48 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (inferring non-exhaustion
from fact that patentee received lower price for cartridges subject to single-use restriction
than for other cartridges and therefore patentee did not receive full reward for lower price
cartridge). However, in the wake of Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S.
617 (2008), the court changed its mind and held that the first sale doctrine applied so as to
invalidate the tie. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 615 F. Supp.
2d 575, 576–77 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
For other cases on patent exhaustion and reuse, see Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (design patent exhausted by unrestricted sale; not
infringement for foreign firm to repair patentee’s “single use” camera for reuse); Kendall Co.
v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (refusing to infer
prohibition on reuse from simple fact that one element of patented product was spent with
each use; device itself capable of roughly three years use); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1342 (2007) (exhaustion did not apply to
self-replicating seed where second generation seed was identical to first generation; because
the second generation seed was never sold at all, patent was not exhausted; further use of the
seed required a license from the patentee); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
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Mallinckrodt were a monopolist in the device. But it could be substantial
even if the device were sold by a non-monopolist in a product
differentiated market. The most likely explanation for why hospitals
might accept Mallinckrodt’s terms is that a third-party payment
mechanism for health insurance covered the device, thus reducing the
transparency of true costs.
At the same time, the first sale rule, which operates as a per se
restraint, seems excessive given the self-deterring nature of harmful
reuse restrictions and the alternative explanations for at least some of
them. Rule of reason analysis under the antitrust laws or perhaps patent
misuse doctrine seems more appropriate to the task. Indeed, the first sale
doctrine as Quanta revitalized it would not even approve a post-sale
restraint on reuse in cases where reuse was dangerous. A patentee could
certainly warn against reuse, but it could not restrain reuse by means of a
patent infringement suit. To be sure, Quanta might permit the patentee
to maintain a breach of contract suit to enforce the single use restriction,
but enforcement would depend on the vagaries of the privity
requirement. For example, if the hospital disposed of the device after a
single use but the waste disposal firm sold them to a renewal firm, a
contract claim could not run against the latter even though notice was
clear.
5.

Price Discrimination

Price discrimination occurs when a seller obtains different ratios of
price to marginal cost from different buyers. Price discrimination is
generally said to come in three kinds, or “degrees.” Virtually all
instances of actual price discrimination are either third-degree or seconddegree discrimination.
In third-degree price discrimination the seller is able ex ante to
segregate customers into different groups based on the group’s
willingness to pay and offer different prices to different groups. A
common example in the IP context is offering different prices to
commercial and personal users, as in both General Talking Pictures and
ProCD.176 One characteristic of third-degree price discrimination is a
discontinuity in buyer substitution that denies the good to some highvalue purchasers while giving the good to others for whom the good is
less valuable. For example, if I charge commercial purchasers of my
sound amplifiers $1000 and personal users $500, the commercial users
will purchase down to the point that their marginal value reaches $1000

176. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938); ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
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and no more. A commercial user who values the next amplifier at $950
will not buy it even though other users, the personal ones, are actually
buying at a price of $500. So a $950 purchaser is turned away while a
$500 is served. This denial to high-value purchasers and sale to lowvalue purchases means that third-degree price discrimination reduces
welfare unless the seller brings in new purchasers under the price
discrimination scheme. As a result, economists since at least Arthur
Cecil Pigou have concluded that third-degree price discrimination
reduces welfare unless it increases total market output.177
By contrast, second-degree price discrimination occurs when the
seller offers a price schedule with differing prices. Customers self-select
the price by choosing where to place themselves on the schedule.
Quantity discounts are an example, as are divisions between first and
coach class airline tickets to the extent that price differences are not
proportional to cost differences. Variable proportion tying arrangements,
in which different customers use the tied product in differing amounts,
are an instance of second-degree price discrimination because the tying
product is offered at one price to everyone and so is the tied product.
Customers “select” the rate of return the arrangement produces to the
seller by choosing the number of tied units to purchase. 178 For example,
in a printer/ink cartridge tie the seller typically cuts the price of the
printer from its standalone profit maximizing level, builds a monopoly
overcharge into the ink cartridge, and then requires all users of the
printer to purchase its cartridges. 179 The result is that monopoly returns
on the printer/cartridge package are higher for higher volume users.
However, everyone purchases ink cartridges down to the point that
marginal value equals the purchase price, with the purchase price being
the same for all. So for example, if the printer manufacturer reduces the
price of the printer and increases the price of tied ink cartridges from
$15 to $20, every buyer will purchase down to the point that the
marginal value of a cartridge to her equals $20. This distinctive feature
of second-degree price discrimination has produced some confusion in
the antitrust literature. It is not the case that variable proportion ties
systematically transfer output from higher- to lower-value customers;

177. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, II.14.13 (4th ed.
1932); Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a
Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259 (1990).
178. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 147
(1988); Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
229, 236 (2005).
179. See, e.g., Static Control Components, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 576–77 (applying first
sale doctrine to invalidate printer/ink cartridge tie).
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only third-degree price discrimination does that.180 To be sure, variable
proportion ties typically result in a reduced price for the tying product
and a higher price for the tied product, and this is a distortion from
perfect competition. But it is not the same distortion that third-degree
price discrimination produces.181
The final type of price discrimination is first-degree, or “perfect”
price discrimination, which occurs when a seller is able to sell each unit
at the highest price that any buyer is willing to pay for it. Variable
proportion ties almost never come close to being first-degree price
discrimination. While a highly accurate variable proportion tie might be
able to meter the relationship between consumer value and the number
of units a customer uses, it cannot capture the residual value that
different customers place on the good. To illustrate, both a printer of
handbills for garage sales and a law firm printing offering statements for
IPOs might require precisely 1000 pages of printing per week. After
that, their willingness to pay falls sharply. If they purchase identical
printers under identical ties they will end up paying the same amount.
However, the garage sale printer might value the printouts at very close
to the incremental price of, say, 3 cents per page, while the law firm
values them at $12 per page. In that case there will be a great deal of
unclaimed consumer surplus remaining from the law firm purchaser and
the price discrimination scheme must be classified as second-degree.
Most variable proportion ties involve a price reduction in the tying
product, sometimes to the competitive level and sometimes even to zero,
accompanied by an increase in the price of the tied product. 182
Depending on the magnitude of (1) the price cut in the tying product, (2)
the price increase in the tied product, and (3) the output effects, a
variable proportion tie can either increase or decrease both general and
consumer welfare.183 Further, since there are three variables, not just
one, it is impossible to make categorical judgments about the
180. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 431 n.89 (2009) (suggesting that
variable proportion ties reallocate output from high-value to low-value users).
181. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9 (manuscript at 10).
182. Virtually every decision that has discussed the issue has indicated that the
defendant reduced rather than increased the price of the tying product when it engaged in
tying. See id at *18–19. For an example of a zero price tying product, see Kentmaster Mfg.
Co. v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 146 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by 164 F.3d 1243 (9th
Cir. 1999) (defendant provided durable meat cutting equipment at no charge to meat cutters
but charged high prices for aftermarket parts); see also Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 660
F.Supp.2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“As is true of other printer manufacturers, Xerox
generally sells its printers at a low margin or a loss, hoping to earn a profit through later sales
of high-margin ink.”).
183. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 9 (manuscript at 19–28).
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relationship between output and welfare. In any event, most price
discrimination ties probably increase output, and many do so
substantially.184 In such cases there is no warrant for believing they are
harmful to either general welfare or consumer welfare. Further, their
profitability does not depend on the exclusion of any rival, and price
discrimination ties are common even in moderately competitive markets,
such as fast-food franchising. 185 As a result there is no warrant for
condemning them as a matter of competition policy, and certainly not
with a categorical per se rule.
The 1912 Henry decision was the last occasion that the Supreme
Court refused to apply the first sale rule to the sale of a patented good
subject to a variable proportion tie. 186 In that case the manufacturer sold
mimeograph machines at below cost and recouped its profits on
overcharges on the consumable supplies.187 Henry was overruled by
Motion Picture Patents, which involved yet another variable proportion
tying arrangement that facilitated price discrimination.188 Since Motion
Picture Patents was decided, patentees have largely relied on contract
restrictions to impose ties rather than post-sale restraints—a result that
the Supreme Court itself suggested in that case. 189 Otherwise they have
avoided the first sale rule by leasing the patented durable goods rather
than selling it.190
184. See id. at 6.
185. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
186. Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also supra notes 54–57
and accompanying text.
187. The lower court’s decision discusses the facts of the case. See A.B. Dick Co.
v. Henry, 149 F. 424, 425 (C.C.N.Y. 1907) (“The evidence establishes that the
complainants sell the machines at a loss, less than the actual cost of making, relying on
sales of supplies therefor for a profit.”); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917) (noting patentee’s argument that the public
benefitted “by the sale of the machine at what is practically its cost”).
188. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 516; see also supra notes 55–56 and
accompanying text.
189. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 509 (“The extent to which the use of the
patented machine may validly be restricted to specific supplies or otherwise by special
contract between the owner of a patent and the purchaser . . . [is] a question outside the
patent law . . . .”). For an example, see Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28 (2006) (refusing to condemn a tie of a patented printer to unpatented ink after
overturning presumption that patented tying product confers market power). While the
patentee in Illinois Tool Works initially took the position that the ink was covered by its
patent it later amended that position and what had started out as an infringement action
became an antitrust challenge to the license agreement. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool
Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
190. See, e.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (leased machines
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The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 provides that patent ties of
this sort are not misuse unless the patentee has market power in the
patented tying product.191 Interestingly, that provision appears to permit
patent ties accompanying the sale of a patented product, in violation of
the first sale doctrine. The provision states that a patentee will not be
guilty of “illegal extension of the patent right” if it “conditioned . . . the
sale of the patented product on the . . . purchase of a separate product”
unless the patentee has market power.192 Since Quanta involved
exclusive dealing and not tying, this provision was not implicated.
However, in Motion Picture Patents the sale of the patented projector
was conditioned on the purchase of a separate product. 193 As the Motion
Picture Patents decision described the first sale doctrine, it clearly
involved an improper extension of the patent right.194 Indeed, while the
“illegal extension of the patent” concern has been widely stated in
misuse law,195 it actually originated in first sale law.196 So it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that the Patent Misuse Reform Act operates to
create a statutory exception to the first sale doctrine for tying
arrangements. Nevertheless, no decision of which I am aware has
interpreted the statute in that way. In any event, the antitrust law
governing ties has evolved significantly and today regards them as
relatively benign. 197 By contrast, the first sale doctrine recognizes no
exception for competitively harmless restraints.
with provision requiring lessee to use patentee’s salt); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 489 (1942) (finding patent misuse when patent holder leased salt injecting
machine with lease provision requiring lessee to use the patentee’s salt tablets); Int’l Bus.
Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (lease requiring lessees of tabulating
machines to use lessor’s punch cards).
191. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000), providing that a patentee shall not be deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent if it has:
[C]onditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of
a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on
which the license or sale is conditioned.
192. Id.
193. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 506 (1917); see supra notes 90–97 and
accompanying text.
194. Id. at 516 (“[T]he exclusive right granted in every patent must be limited to
the invention described in the claims of the patent, and that it is not competent for the
owner of a patent, by notice attached to its machine, to, in effect, extend the scope of its
patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation, but
which are no part of the patented invention . . . .”).
195. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 10 n.43, 18–20).
196. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
197. See generally AREEDA, ELHAUGE, & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ch. 17.

NYU POST SALE RESTRAINTS 15 FEB 2011

148

2/15/2011 6:06 AM

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

The statutory misuse provision and the permissive attitude of
modern antitrust law should not be read as a broad congressional policy
of permitting price discrimination by means of variable proportion tying
arrangements. The Patent Misuse Reform Act exonerates patent ties
from misuse claims only when the seller lacks market power in the
patented product, and at least minimal market power is necessary for
price discrimination.198 In Illinois Tool Works the Supreme Court
equated this requirement for misuse with the antitrust laws as well.199 By
contrast, assuming that the Patent Misuse Reform Act does not create an
exception, the first sale doctrine applies what is effectively a per se rule
to price discrimination ties on patented goods without any inquiry into
market power or anticompetitive effects.
While second-degree price discrimination is the typical result of
variable proportion tying arrangements, third-degree price
discrimination that can be facilitated by post-sale restraints typically
arises from field-of-use restrictions. For example, a “noncommercial use
only” restriction is likely to be a way that a patentee can charge a higher
price for commercial than for noncommercial users of its product. While
the patentee might make the initial sale of the noncommercial version to
a noncommercial user, the restriction would be needed to restrain further
transactions to commercial purchasers—that is, to prevent arbitrage. 200
By the same token, selectively used “single use” restrictions may
discriminate between those licensed to make unlimited uses and those
subject to the restrictions.201 A restriction that results in different prices
for different categories of users, such as commercial and residential,
does in fact transfer sales from high value to lower value purchasers, and
thus reduces welfare unless output increases.202
Given that most price discrimination ties are lawful today, the “first
sale” question is whether they should be enforced by infringement suits
rather than breach of contract suits. That question can be important in
situations where contributory infringers are easy to detect but primary
infringers are not. For example, Lexmark may wish to tie printers and
198. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 120, ¶ 721.
199. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (equating misuse
and antitrust standards for tying arrangements).
200. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing arbitrage issues with licenses that attempt to price discriminate).
201. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
830, 836 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (printer manufacturer sold patented cartridges at a lower price
subject to condition that they not be refilled); cf. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976
F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (illustrating that single-use restrictions might not involve
higher prices for the sale of the same article without the restriction).
202. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
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ink cartridges. However, if it is unable to use a technological lock to
exclude non-Lexmark cartridges, the tying restriction could be very
difficult to enforce against Lexmark’s customers. It would be very costly
to monitor customer aftermarket purchasing behavior. By contrast,
widespread manufacturing of cartridges designed for Lexmark printers
might be easy to detect. These “pirate” manufacturers would be guilty of
contributory infringement if the tie was enforceable by an infringement
action, but they are not in privity of contract with Lexmark and so a
purely contractual tie will not bind them. If notice is essential, Lexmark
could take care of that problem by informing these cartridge
manufacturers of the restriction.
Perhaps there is no good policy argument for giving the holder of
an IP right a greater power to engage in price discrimination than the
owner of any tangible asset.203 But state policy respecting post-sale
restraints on personal property is mixed, with a trend toward enforcing
them. 204 In any event, there is no obvious reason why federal
competition or patent policy should prevent post-sale restraints imposed
on those with proper notice, simply because they might facilitate price
discrimination but with no query into social or consumer harm. If price
discrimination can be shown to injure competition or work as a
disincentive to innovation it should be condemned as a matter of
competition policy. The per se rule contained in the first sale doctrine
thus seems seriously overdeterrent to the extent that it condemns the
tying condition with no query whatsoever into competitive effects or
propensity for harm.
6.

Restraints on Innovation

A restraint on innovation can arise when the purchaser of a good is
prevented from developing a competing good.205 For example, in

203. See generally Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Patent
Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 221–24 (2007)
(discussing issues with price discrimination of patented products); see also Wendy J.
Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1367, 1386–90 (1998) (questioning justifications for price discrimination);
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,
1874–78 (1984) (reviewing problems created by price discrimination). But see Makan
Delrahim, The Long and Winding Road: Convergence in the Application of Antitrust to
Intellectual Property, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 259, 264 (2005) (“[A]llowing the firm that
developed the software to price discriminate may increase social welfare by promoting
the efficient commercialization of the asset.”).
204. See generally Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1449 (2004).
205. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 35).
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Lasercomb the Fourth Circuit found misuse in a software licensor’s
condition prohibiting the licensee from developing any product that
competed with the licensed software.206 While Lasercomb involved a
license restriction on a copyright, the same principle could apply to the
sale of a patented product subject to the condition that the purchaser
does not develop a competing product.207 The cost of a lost opportunity
to innovate can be substantial,208 and that harm could result whether or
not the patentee had significant market power in its patented good. 209
Concern about post-sale restraints on purchasers’ innovations in
competition with the patented device could be a perfectly good reason
for denying enforcement of particular restrictions, such as exclusive use
or noncompetition covenants. However, this concern hardly justifies a
draconian rule that prohibits every post-sale restraint without any inquiry
into the nature or likely effects of the challenged restriction.
III.
DOES THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE?

Those decisions that have enforced a patentee’s “conditional” sales
inconsistently with the Supreme Court’s exhaustion doctrine recognize
violators as infringers or contributory infringers.210 By contrast,
206. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990).
207. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1301, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(finding possible misuse in package licensing arrangement that may have prevented
licensee from developing a competing product), rev’d en banc, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2010); McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1948) (finding patent
misuse when patentee licensed patent subject to condition that licensee not develop
competing technology); Nat’l Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256
(3d Cir. 1943) (finding misuse when patentee conditioned manufacturing license on
licensee’s promise not to manufacture competing goods); Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673
F. Supp. 2d 931, 939–40 No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2009) (finding possible misuse when Apple prevented use of its computer operating
system on a non-Apple computer, thus restraining development of rival’s machine
designed to use Apple and Microsoft operating systems interchangeably). A later
decision upset the misuse finding. See Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931,
939–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
208. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247
(2007).
209. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 17, 45–46).
210. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). In Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the Federal Circuit essentially
returned to the Henry rule. See Patterson, supra note 209, at 167–71; Edwin E. Richards,
Drafting Licenses to Guide Whether Potential Disputes Lie in Contract or Infringement, 7
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 45 (2002) (implying continued use of patented product after
breach of conditional license may support an infringement claim).
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licensing agreements themselves are governed by contract law and
generally enforced in state court. They do not implicate first sale
doctrine, but they can be enforced only by breach of contract actions. 211
Federal Circuit jurisprudence has not always been clear on the condition
versus contract distinction. 212 That court has spoken of conditional sales
that evade the exhaustion requirement as requiring “a restriction having
contractual significance . . . .”213 However, when these “contracts” are to
be enforced, the Federal Circuit has permitted enforcement via patent
infringement actions rather than breach of contract actions.214
Without stating any policy argument for its preservation, the
Supreme Court nevertheless soundly reaffirmed the first sale doctrine in
its 2008 Quanta decision.215 Further, it did so with the enthusiastic
support of the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division. In its amicus brief the government had argued very
forcefully that “[r]estrictions on downstream use or resale may arise as a
matter of state contract law, but not patent law.”216 Ironically, this was
the same Antitrust Division that had argued a year earlier that the per se
rule against RPM should be overruled, 217 and that has very severely cut
211. The Court observed this distinction already in the late nineteenth century. See
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 665 (1895):
Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts
brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we
express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as
a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of
the patent laws.
212. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 140, at 34–35, 56 (criticizing the Federal
Circuit’s ambiguous and incorrect use of contract doctrine).
213. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1453
(Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1108
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (conditional sale requires an “express contractual undertaking by the
purchaser”).
214. See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2006), rev’d sub. nom Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008);
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Interestingly, both LG
and Mallinckrodt relied on U.C.C. provisions stating the existence of a contract in order to
find that the condition existed. See LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at
708 n.7.
215. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
216. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *175,
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL
3353102. Or, as the government articulated the first sale doctrine in opening its argument:
“The doctrine bars the use of patent law (but not contract law) to enforce restrictions on a
purchaser’s use or resale of a patented article that was purchased from the patentee or from
someone authorized by the patentee to sell the article.” Id. at 7.
217. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3,
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480),
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back enforcement of the law against vertical restraints. So why such a
hard line against post-sale conditions that can be enforced by IP
infringement suits, with so much tolerance of contractual arrangements
that can accomplish the same thing?
The answer must be that the government is not particularly
concerned about the substance of the restraint at issue—whether it be
tying or RPM or some form of exclusivity—but with its form. That is,
there must be something inherently wrong about using licensing
conditions plus the threat of infringement suits, as opposed to simple
breach of contract actions. Further, notice must be inadequate to address
the issue.
The worst problem of the first sale rule is that it lacks subtlety. To
be sure, there is a set of technical rules that determines when a
qualifying “sale” of a patented or copyrighted good has occurred.
However, once such a sale is found enforcement of the post-sale restraint
is denied automatically, with no consideration of the restraint’s purpose
or effect. This means that market power, competitive effects and
implications for innovation are all irrelevant. That naturally invites the
question whether the first sale doctrine serves any useful purpose at all.
Is there a set of cases where simple contract enforcement is inadequate
and where the antitrust and misuse rules will fail to police every
behavior that we want to see controlled?
Post-sale conditions enforced by infringement actions seem
superior to contract suits when the restraint is socially beneficial and a
large and diverse number of downstream people are affected. Consider
the servitudes problem in real property again.218 If Alpha does not want
commercial uses on Blackacre, she can impose a servitude on the land,
have it properly recorded, and that is the end of the matter. Everyone
who wants to buy or build on Blackacre has constructive notice of the
restriction. Alternatively, Alpha could contract with the initial purchaser
of Blackacre and agree that this purchaser upon pain of damages will
impose the restriction on all parties downstream, and potentially we
could have an endless series of such contracts. But this solution is much
messier and increases transaction costs very significantly by requiring
ongoing contracting and re-contracting. In sum, the “infringement”
action permits enforcement of the restriction at much lower transaction
costs than the endless series of breach of contract actions.
Clearly, however, notice is key. The law of servitudes on real
property generally provides that if the servitude is not properly recorded,
then the servitude cannot be enforced against a subsequent bona fide
2007 WL 173650.
218. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
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purchaser without actual notice. That requirement makes the market for
servitudes function very well and has largely eliminated holdup
problems—for example, the intending developer who buys land for a
subdivision and finds out only after development has begun that there is
a non-development servitude in place. Unfortunately, IP rights and IP
licenses have nothing approaching the rather effective recordation and
notice provisions that apply to land titles. So if such limitations are to be
enforced this places on the enforcer the obligation to see to it that notice
is effective under the circumstances.219
As a general matter one can be guilty of patent infringement
without having any notice whatsoever.220 If that rule were applied to
post-sale restraints, the result could be a significant problem of hold-up,
as innocent subsequent purchasers could be sued for patent infringement
for violating conditions they knew nothing about. But as noted
previously, those courts that have enforced post-sale restraints have
either required that timely notice of the restriction be given to the
offender or else they have observed that notice was in fact given. 221 If
notice had been the government’s only concern in Quanta, it could have
urged the court to uphold the Federal Circuit’s departure from the
historical first sale rule, but conditioned it on adequate downstream
notice to affected parties.
To be sure, a notice is not the same thing as a contract. First of all,
notices are typically unilateral acts and can be incomplete as to content,
target, and communication.222 One who sees “This copy machine may be
maintained only by Alpha Corp.” printed on a machine does not know if
she is looking at a restraint on an unpatented good, which may or may
not be enforceable under state law; whether the patent has expired; or,
depending on the language, the precise meaning of the terms. Further,
the notice may not be apparent to every person who might later be in a
position to do maintenance on the machine; it could be removed, or it
might not be contained on a particular component that is sent in for
servicing. Under Henry a complete stranger to any transaction having to
do with the machine, but who knew of the notice, would be guilty of
patent infringement if he replaced a gasket or perhaps even if he dusted
off the glass cover.
The notice problem also gets much trickier when a good changes
hands many times, particularly if it is incorporated by the production
process into other goods, as in Quanta. Just as real property covenants
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Hovenkamp, supra note 141.
See supra notes 121–31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02 (2010).
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“run with the land,” patent conditions, if enforceable, travel with the
good from one owner to another. In real property law we deal with this
problem with a largely effective set of recording provisions. But
patented goods have no equivalent system and so it is much more likely
that the good will pass to someone who does not have adequate notice. 223
Once again, however, the solution seems to be to make patent
infringement in such cases depend on reasonably communicated notice
and to place the burden of providing effective and timely notice on the
licensing patentee.
Also important is the fact that unlike breach of contract actions,
patent infringement actions have historically incorporated a preference
for injunctive relief. The right to bring an infringement action for an
injunction could yield a holdup problem in situations where the
subsequent purchaser lacked adequate notice of the restrictions, but that
problem is addressed by an effective notice requirement. In any event,
under the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, injunctions are to be issued
for patent infringement only when the plaintiff meets the same criteria as
apply to equitable actions generally. 224 It is not obvious today that the
right to an injunction to enforce a post-sale restraint via patent law
would be any broader than the right to enforce it by a contract suit.
Contract remedies would probably be expectation damages in most
situations.225 Most actions would be filed in state court unless there is
diversity jurisdiction in federal court. By contrast, a patent infringement
suit could be filed in a single federal court against all infringers,
including both the first purchaser made subject to the restriction and its
customers, users, service personnel, and the like.226 Damages can be the
reasonable royalty rate together with interest and costs227 or up to treble
damages for willful infringers, which presumably includes downstream
customers who took with actual notice of the restriction.228 Of course,
223. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 120, at 46–72 (2008).
224. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006); see also
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
631, 657 (2007) (finding that after eBay, permanent injunctions tend to be issued when
patentee and infringer are direct competitors and tend not to be issued when patentee is a
non-practicing entity).
225. See U.C.C. § 2-714 (2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded
Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COL. L. REV. 1428, 1446
(2004).
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
227. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
228. Id. To prove willful infringement, the patentee must show the infringer was
objectively reckless in determining whether they would infringe the patent. In re Seagate
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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successful antitrust challenges can do the same thing, and in that case
treble damages would be mandatory. 229
Another possible difference between post-sale conditions and
contract terms is jurisdictional. The Federal Circuit’s now defunct
jurisprudence permitting post-sale restraints implied that the conditions
could be enforced by patent infringement actions, and appeals from
these actions go automatically and exclusively to the Federal Circuit. 230
By contrast, breach of contract actions ordinarily go into state court,
reaching the federal courts only upon the happenstance of diversity of
citizenship or a suitable federal question. Appeals would go to the
appropriate regional Circuit.
The government also argued in Quanta that restrictions that are
found to be within the patent grant may be relatively free from antitrust
scrutiny, while licensing agreements are not.231 But that argument seems
quite hollow in a world where antitrust treatment of vertical restrictions
is minimal and in any event patent “misuse” is governed by antitrust
principles. There is little reason to think that an anticompetitive restraint
imposed as a condition would be treated differently from the same
restraint imposed by contract. Cases such as Univis make clear that in
the process of applying the first sale doctrine the Court was also
expressing a policy about RPM, which was unlawful per se at the time
Univis was decided. 232
So traditional antitrust analysis could be used to address post-sale
restraints no matter how they are treated. Indeed, to the extent that the
law of patent and copyright “misuse” deviates from antitrust principles,
it condemns more rather than less. 233 Further, “misuse” law derives from
the IP statutes themselves and clearly applies to notice restrictions that
229. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (giving Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals from cases arising under Patent Act); see also Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the district court, and turns on whether the
action arises under federal patent law.”).
231. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 29,
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL
3353102 (“The Federal Circuit’s approach also has the potential to erode downstream
competition by permitting patentees to avoid anti-trust scrutiny of restrictions on the use and
resale of products embodying their inventions.”). Some examples include Bement v. Nat’l
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91–95 (1902) (upholding price restriction as within the scope of
the patent) and United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1936) (upholding
price restrictions “reasonably” within the scope of the patent grant).
232. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); see supra notes 152–
56 and accompanying text.
233. See Bohannan, supra note 21 (manuscript at 18).
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are intended to be enforced by infringement actions.234 Today, resale
price restrictions such as those in General Electric or Univis would
rarely be unlawful, given that the per se rules against both minimum and
maximum RPM have been overturned. 235 Tying and exclusive dealing or
related practices could still be actionable. While tying is arguably still
covered by a per se rule, 236 exclusive dealing is addressed under the rule
of reason and, in any event, both require a traditional showing of market
power—i.e., market power cannot be presumed from the existence of the
patent itself. 237
The post-sale restriction that the Federal Circuit enforced in Quanta
resembles tying or exclusive dealing, but it seems unlikely that this was
its intended purpose. 238 The restriction forbade downstream purchasers
of parts manufactured by Intel under the patentee’s license from using
them in combination with any non-Intel components. Ordinarily a
restriction limiting the purchaser or licensee to using only the seller’s
brand would be exclusive dealing, or tying if multiple products were
involved. 239 In this case, however, Intel made only a tiny minority of the
numerous components that go into a computer. It would be a little like
Firestone Tire Co. entering into a contract with General Motors agreeing
to supply tires to GM but only on the condition that GM not use any
non-Firestone products in its automobiles. It would simply be impossible
for GM to comply with the condition. The purpose of the restriction
must have been to turn the downstream computer assemblers into
infringers, presumably so that the patentee could extract additional
royalties from purchasers who had already made specific commitments
to the patentee’s technology. That was the position that the government

234. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942);
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). All three decisions involved notice
restrictions and patent infringement suits for their violation.
235. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(overturning per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997) (overturning per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance);
see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶¶ 1620 (minimum RPM), 1635 (maximum
RPM).
236. On this point, see 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 1720 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2005).
237. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (upsetting
presumption of market power for patented tying products); see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, JOHN
L. SOLOW & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 518 (3d ed. 2007).
238. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d
sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
239. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1821.
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took in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court.240
IV.
CONCLUSION: POST-SALE RESTRAINT DOCTRINE

The problem of reaching downstream parties disturbed both sides
of the Quanta dispute, but seems to favor the Federal Circuit’s approach.
Those favoring the Federal Circuit’s approach speak of the great
difficulty of identifying downstream purchasers and negotiating
individual licenses with them. Those favoring the contract approach
speak of the problem of taking downstream users by surprise by means
of ineffectively communicated restrictions and a set of infringement
rules that can be enforced without regard to privity of contract and the
limitations inherent in contract damage rules.
The Supreme Court and the government’s position in Quanta seems
excessively draconian, yielding a per se rule against a practice that was
not clearly shown to be more harmful than its alternatives, at least when
infringement actions are conditioned on effective notice communicated
in a timely manner. In a world in which both post-sale conditions and
license restrictions are available one would expect the parties to
negotiate the one that was most profitable to them. It is not obvious that
one is more harmful than the other, at least in those circumstances when
adequate notice is given to potential downstream infringers.
In the sixty-year interval between Univis and Quanta, the Supreme
Court’s most recent two first sale cases, the Court (1) adopted and later
rejected a per se rule for vertical nonprice restraints;241 (2) abandoned
the per se rule against maximum RPM in 1997242 and minimum RPM in
2007;243 (3) greatly loosened the law against tying arrangements;244 and
240. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27,
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL
3353102:
This case provides an illustration. Absent patent exhaustion, the lawful
purchase of an article useful only for practicing the patent provides no value to
the purchaser until completion of further negotiations and a further payment
for the right to use or to resell. Moreover, the need for further negotiations and
payments may depend on a court’s after-the-fact determination whether the
seller adequately expressed a limitation on the rights conveyed.
241. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (condemning
vertical nonprice restraints under per se rule), overruled by Continental T.V. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
242. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997).
243. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
244. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters.,
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(4) developed more lenient standards for exclusive dealing. The Illinois
Tool Works decision upsetting the market power presumption for
patented tying products is particularly instructive, because the court
made it clear that both antitrust and misuse doctrine had evolved toward
considerably greater toleration of post-sale tying restrictions on patented
goods.245
The reversion in Quanta requires an explanation. A coherent legal
doctrine of post-sale IP restraints must first identify the set of goals it is
designed to serve. In this case there are two: restraints on competition
and restraints on innovation, together with a more residual concern to
protect access to the public domain. As a policy matter, whether the
restraint is carried out by a condition and enforced by an infringement
action, or by a contract term enforceable through state law, is a detail
that depends greatly on the communication of effective notice, but
otherwise has little effect on either competition or innovation policy. If
the Supreme Court had viewed the problem this way it could have
produced a more unified and useful set of legal rules governing post-sale
restraints that threaten either competition or innovation.

Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
245. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 33–37.

